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INTRODUCTION: 
A SURVEY OF THE COUNTERFEIT TRADEMARKED 
GOODS INDUSTRY IN NEW YORK CITY 
Canal Street bisects Lower Manhattan from east to west little 
more than four miles south of the lavish storefronts of Madison 
and Fifth Avenues that constitute the apex of high-end luxury 
retailing in New York City.1  The extravagance of the gilded retail 
temples of Fifth and Madison Avenues mirrors the hedonistic 
opulence of the high-cost, high-margin wares these shops 
showcase and sell.  The cramped, dank, and dingy retail storefronts 
of Canal Street, sandwiched as they are between suspect 
fishmongers and open-air food stalls, encourage, in marked 
contrast, recollections that the low-lying land atop which the 
present-day thoroughfare sits originally served as Manhattan’s 
primary sewage culvert.2  Yet, a cursory perusal of the stores of 
Canal Street would suggest to a naïve—or willfully blind—
shopper that these low-rent operations are miraculously able to 
stock the same luxury fashion accessories as the up-market 
retailers situated further uptown, and are inexplicably able to sell 
such items at exponentially lower price points.  Such an 
unenlightened consumer might conclude that the low prices of 
Canal Street’s luxury goods are a product of the lower overhead 
costs borne by the owners of the smaller, shabbier stores.  The real 
means through which Canal Street retailers are able to price their 
ersatz luxury goods so far below the levels adhered to by 
 
 1 Google Maps, http://maps.google.com (last visited Oct. 5, 2006).  The actual 
distance varies depending on the particular start and end points of the measurement. 
 2 See EDWIN G. BURROWS & MIKE WALLACE, GOTHAM: A HISTORY OF NEW YORK 
CITY TO 1898, at 359–60 (1999).  Canal Street initially existed as an eight-foot wide open 
sewer. See id.  When the city covered this ditch over in 1819, it neglected to install air 
traps, so the area continued to stink of sewage. See id. at 360. 
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legitimate retailers, however, is an open secret for anyone who 
cares to look: Canal Street is the epicenter of New York City’s 
counterfeit luxury goods trade.  On this teeming thoroughfare little 
more than a mile in length3 one can find innumerable seemingly 
authentic brand name products from Sony electronics to Gucci 
handbags.  None of this merchandise is real, but no one seems to 
care. 
The heart of counterfeit goods retailing along Canal Street lies 
only four-tenths of a mile north of the offices of the Criminal 
Division of the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern 
District of New York, and only two-tenths of a mile north of the 
New York County District Attorney’s Office at One Hogan Place.4  
The distance between the counterfeit goods retailers of Canal 
Street and the offices of the government attorneys who bear the 
burden of prosecuting such operations is so short that a New York 
County Assistant District Attorney could walk up to Canal Street, 
purchase a counterfeit designer handbag, and return to the office in 
the course of a morning coffee break.5  Astonishingly, a 
government prosecutor could embark on such an excursion without 
violating a single state or federal law, and could thus proudly 
march back into her office with statutory impunity. 
Whether she could make this walk with a clear conscience, 
however, is another matter altogether.  In 2004, the value of the 
global trade in pirated and counterfeit goods surpassed 
$600 billion.6  Almost seven percent of all merchandise sold 
worldwide is either counterfeit or pirated.7  American businesses 
 
 3 Google Maps, supra note 1. 
 4 Id.  All commercial activity along Canal Street, both legal and illicit, counterfeit 
goods retailing included, is concentrated east of the Avenue of the Americas. Id.  West of 
the Avenue of the Americas, Canal Street transforms to function principally as a feeder 
for the Holland Tunnel leading towards New Jersey. Id. 
 5 The Manhattan Criminal Courts Building, which houses the headquarters of the New 
York County District Attorney’s Office, lies atop land that once contained Collect Pond, 
the cesspool that drained into the culvert that begat Canal Street. See Carol Groneman, 
Collect, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEW YORK CITY 250, 250 (Kenneth T. Jackson ed., 
1995). 
 6 Laurie J. Flynn, U.S. Discloses Moves to Stop Piracy of Intellectual Property, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 22, 2005, at C7 (citing statistics from the World Customs Organization and 
Interpol). 
 7 Id. (citing projections of the World Customs Organization and Interpol). 
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estimate that the scourge of counterfeit and pirated products costs 
them $250 billion in lost revenues every year.8  The value of the 
counterfeit goods trade in New York City alone is $23 billion.9  Of 
particular interest to the hypothetical counterfeit-handbag-
purchasing Assistant District Attorney, the City of New York, her 
employer, loses $1.03 billion in uncollected tax revenues each year 
at the hands of the illegal counterfeit goods trade.10  While this 
attorney prosecutes a myriad of miscreants, including traffickers of 
counterfeit trademarked goods, she is contributing to the 
defrauding of her employer—though technically committing no 
crime—as she carries her trial materials to the courtroom in a 
counterfeit bag. 
Part I of this Note addresses the daunting size and pervasive 
scope of the worldwide trade in counterfeit trademarked goods, 
while noting that United States law, at both state and federal levels, 
lags behind the statutory schemes of certain European nations in its 
efforts to stem the propagation of ersatz luxury wares.  Part II 
examines the identity and methods of operation of the 
multinational organized crime groups and terrorist organizations 
that dominate the illegal counterfeit goods trade in the United 
States. 
Part III chronicles American anti-counterfeiting enforcement 
efforts at the federal level, with a primary focus on the nature and 
use of the criminal provisions of the Trademark Counterfeiting Act 
of 1984 (“1984 Act”),11 the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt 
Organizations Act (“RICO”),12 and the Money Laundering Control 
Act of 1986 (“Money Laundering Act”)13 in prosecutions for 
trafficking in counterfeit trademarked goods.  Part III also 
addresses the changes wrought by Congress’ recent amendment of 
the 1984 Act criminalizing trademarked labels unattached to other 
 
 8 Id. 
 9 Press Release, Office of N.Y. City Comptroller, Thompson: Counterfeiting Costs 
NYC More than $1 Billion Annually (Nov. 22, 2004) (on file with author), available at 
http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/press/2004_releases/pr04-11-065.shtm. 
 10 Id.  This loss arises from a combination of unpaid sales, business income, and 
personal income taxes. Id. 
 11 18 U.S.C.A. § 2320 (West 2006). 
 12 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2000). 
 13 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–1957 (2000). 
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goods.14  Part IV assesses state-level prohibitions against 
trafficking in counterfeit goods from the standpoint of New York 
state law, devoting particular attention to the trademark 
counterfeiting,15 enterprise corruption,16 and money laundering17 
provisions of the New York Penal Law. 
Part V surveys the civil anti-counterfeiting enforcement 
options available to trademark owners, concentrating on trademark 
owners’ ability to sue the landlords of businesses that sell 
counterfeit goods under the Lanham Act18 and New York Real 
Property Law19 through the doctrine of contributory liability.20  
Part V also considers why trademark owners fail to make more 
extensive use of their capacity to sue enterprises engaged in the 
trafficking and sale of counterfeit goods under the civil provisions 
of RICO.21 
Part VI concludes that while legislators could amend the 
statutory anti-counterfeiting provisions presently in force at both 
the state and federal levels in certain limited respects as one 
component of a pervasive effort to curb the proliferation of 
counterfeit goods, the prohibitions against trademark 
counterfeiting as they currently exist are on the whole sufficient to 
combat and curtail the counterfeit goods trade, provided law 
enforcement and prosecutorial agencies employ and apply the 
existing statutes with diligence and consistency.  Neither state nor 
federal law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies, however, 
 
 14 See Stop Counterfeiting in Manufactured Goods Act, Pub. L. No. 109-181, sec. 1–2, 
§ 2320, 120 Stat. 285, 285 (2006) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2320 (West 
2006)). 
 15 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 165.70–165.74 (McKinney 2006). 
 16 Organized Crime Control Act, N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 460.00–460.80 (McKinney 
2006). 
 17 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 470.00–470.25 (McKinney 2006). 
 18 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051–1129 (West 2006). 
 19 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 231 (McKinney 2006). 
 20 See generally Barbara Kolsun & Jonathan Bayer, Indirect Infringement and 
Counterfeiting: Remedies Available Against Those Who Knowingly Rent to 
Counterfeiters, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 383, 413–17 (1998); Fara S. Sunderji, 
Note, Protecting Online Auction Sites from the Contributory Trademark Liability Storm: 
A Legislative Solution to the Tiffany Inc. v. eBay Inc. Problem, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 
909, 919–23 (2005). 
 21 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2000). 
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make effective use of the prohibitions against trademark 
counterfeiting presently in force.  Though both federal and New 
York State statutes criminalize trafficking in counterfeit goods 
irrespective of the dollar value of the merchandise involved, law 
enforcement agencies evince little interest in arresting street-level 
vendors of counterfeit goods, and government attorneys 
demonstrate scant concern with prosecuting such low-level 
offenders unless such interdictions are manifestly capable of 
leading up the criminal food chain to high-volume distributors and 
manufacturers of counterfeit goods.22  As long as this blasé 
enforcement pattern persists, the counterfeit goods trade will 
continue unabated. 
I. THE UNITED STATES REFUSES TO RECOGNIZE AND REMEDY  
THE DANGERS OF COUNTERFEIT GOODS 
Like steerers who point addicts towards narcotics dealers 
lurking in the lobbies and apartments of buildings in Washington 
Heights, barkers for counterfeit goods retailers ply the sidewalks of 
Canal Street surreptitiously beckoning would-be customers into 
squalid storefronts to purchase wares bearing the brand names of 
renowned luxury goods retailers such as Gucci and Louis Vuitton.  
In Washington Heights, the George Washington Bridge and 
Interstate 95, both nearby,23 provide convenient entry and exit 
conduits for drug buyers, many of whom are suburbanites eager to 
make a quick escape from the city once they score their drug of 
choice.  Likewise, the eastern and western bookends of Canal 
Street, the Manhattan Bridge and the Holland Tunnel,24 serve to 
expedite out-of-town visitors’ excursions into Lower Manhattan to 
purchase counterfeit luxury merchandise. 
No quick escape is necessary, however, after purchasing 
counterfeit luxury goods.  If police officers in Washington Heights 
observed a drug buyer purchase narcotics from a known dealer, 
 
 22 See Alison Neumer, Faux Real: For Some Buying Fake Designer Duds Is a No-
Brainer, but Does Going Cheap End Up Costing You the Most?, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 15, 
2004, at 48 (citing CEO of a corporate investigation firm). 
 23 See Google Maps, supra note 1. 
 24 See id. 
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enter a car with out-of-state license plates, and head for the George 
Washington Bridge, they would pull the vehicle over, search for 
the contraband, as the United States Supreme Court permits them 
to do,25 and arrest the occupants.  Law enforcement agencies 
indeed arrest and prosecute, at least to some extent, importers and 
retailers of counterfeit goods.26  If, however, police officers in 
Lower Manhattan observe someone purchase counterfeit luxury 
goods, enter a car with out-of-state license plates, and drive off 
towards the Holland tunnel, the officers would not use the 
purchase of the merchandise as a basis to stop the vehicle, would 
not search the car for the counterfeit items, and would not arrest 
the occupants for purchasing the goods.  Even if law enforcement 
officers wanted to arrest such retail-level buyers of counterfeit 
goods, they could not legally effect such an arrest.27 
Italy and France, likely spurred on by the aggressive lobbying 
efforts of European luxury goods producers, criminalized the 
purchase of counterfeit merchandise in the summer of 2005.28  In 
France, defendants convicted of buying counterfeit goods, even at 
the retail-level, now face up to three years in prison.29  In the 
United States, however, no criminal liability exists under either 
state or federal statutory schemes for purchasing counterfeit 
products.30  Under New York State law, a defendant who sells 
counterfeit trademarked goods faces a maximum of one year in jail 
upon conviction, provided the retail value of the wares bearing the 
 
 25 See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 826 (1982) (holding that police officers 
may conduct a warrantless search of an automobile if they have probable cause to believe 
there is contraband concealed within the vehicle).  See also California v. Carney, 471 
U.S. 386, 394-95 (1985) (holding that a reduced expectation of privacy in motor vehicles 
results from the extensive government regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on 
highways). 
 26 See, e.g., United States v. Cho, 136 F.3d 982, 983 (5th Cir. 1998) (wherein United 
States Customs agents conducted surveillance on defendant’s counterfeit handbag 
retailing operation and defendant consequently pled guilty to two counts of trafficking in 
counterfeit goods in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a) (2000)). 
 27 See generally, Neumer, supra note 22. 
 28 See Allessandra Galloni, Bagging Fakers and Sellers—Makers of Luxury Goods Try 
New Legal Tactics Against Those Who Aid Counterfeiters, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2006, at 
B1. 
 29 See id. 
 30 See id. 
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counterfeit trademark is one thousand dollars or less.31  Prosecutors 
cannot even charge a buyer of counterfeit goods with a crime, 
regardless of the retail value of the merchandise he or she has 
purchased.32 
Yet the international market for counterfeit goods is nearly 
twice the size of the worldwide market for illicit drugs.  The dollar 
value of the American counterfeit goods market exceeds the dollar 
value of the American market for illegal narcotics by roughly 
$100 billion, and the disparity continues to widen with each 
passing year.  The value of the global market in illicit drugs, based 
on retail sale prices and with government seizures and other losses 
to suppliers taken into account, totaled $322 billion in 2003, while 
the value of the worldwide counterfeit goods trade surpassed 
$600 billion.33  The North American segment of the worldwide 
illegal narcotics market, valued at $142 billion and dominated by 
the appetites of the United States, comprised forty-four percent of 
the global aggregate marketplace, while American businesses lose 
an estimated $250 billion each year to the illicit counterfeit goods 
trade.34  Between 2001 and 2004, the incidence of seizures of 
counterfeit goods at America’s borders jumped by eighty-one 
percent.35  Even if heightened governmental interdiction 
precipitated a portion of this increase, the rapid increase in seizure 
rates suggests that the trade in counterfeit goods is a premiere 
growth industry for criminal enterprises operating within the 
United States.  Indeed, government officials concede that, as in the 
narcotics trade, seized items constitute only a fraction of the 
 
 31 See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.15, 165.71–165.72 (McKinney 2006).  The term “retail 
value” means the actual retail value of the counterfeit goods, not the higher retail value 
the goods would have if they were legitimate. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.70 cmt. 
(McKinney 2006) (William C. Donnino, Practice Commentary).  For further discussion 
of New York state statutory provisions prohibiting trademark counterfeiting, see infra 
Part IV. 
 32 See Neumer, supra note 22. 
 33 1 U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, 2005 WORLD DRUG REPORT at 127, U.N. Sales 
No. E.05.XI.10 (2005); Flynn, supra note 6. 
 34 U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, supra note 33, at 128; Flynn, supra note 6. 
 35 Thomas Crampton, U.S. Coordinates Efforts to Stop Counterfeit Goods, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 5, 2004, at C12 (citing figures proffered by then-Under Secretary of Homeland 
Security Asa Hutchison). 
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market for counterfeit goods.36  The global trade in illicit 
counterfeit goods, then, more lucrative for participants and more 
costly for society than the criminal narcotics industry, has 
burgeoned into the largest illicit all-cash business in the world. 
As the dominant illicit industry worldwide, the counterfeit 
goods trade has predictably attracted the interest of international 
organized crime groups.37  Drawn by the allure of the high rates of 
return and extensive profits reaped from trafficking in counterfeit 
goods, and further encouraged by lackadaisical governmental 
enforcement of anti-counterfeiting measures, organized crime 
factions have come to dominate the importation, trafficking and 
distribution of high-volume counterfeit trademarked goods in the 
United States.38  For organized criminal enterprises, the counterfeit 
goods trade is an ideal illicit business because the considerable 
financial rewards that abound in the industry substantially 
outweigh the commensurately minor risk of piquing the ire of 
governmental enforcement agencies.39 
II. ASIAN ORGANIZED CRIME ENTERPRISES DOMINATE THE 
AMERICAN COUNTERFEIT GOODS TRADE 
While organized crime groups import and distribute much of 
the illicit luxury merchandise sold in the United States, 
counterfeiters in Asia manufacture the vast majority of these 
goods.40  China is the primary source for counterfeit luxury goods 
 
 36 See Tina Cassidy, Bagging the Knockoffs: There’s Nothing Like the Real Thing, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 26, 2002, at D1 (noting a statement of Nancy Kratzer, Assistant 
Director for Fraud Investigations, U.S. Customs, and Director of the National Intellectual 
Property Rights Coordination Center). 
 37 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 104-177, at 3 (1995) (“[C]ounterfeiting has grown into a 
multibillion dollar, highly sophisticated illegal business, increasingly involving organized 
crime syndicates.”). 
 38 See, e.g., David Johnston, Threats and Responses: The Money Trail; Fake Goods 
Support Terrorism, Interpol Official Is to Testify, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2003, at A11 
(noting Secretary General of Interpol Ronald K. Noble’s testimony that the connection 
between organized crime groups and counterfeit goods is strong and notorious). 
 39 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 104-177, at 4. 
 40 See Cassidy, supra note 36. 
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sold throughout the world.41  Within China, production of 
counterfeit luxury merchandise is concentrated in southern 
provinces such as Guangdong.42  No doubt owing to China’s 
dominance in the manufacturing of counterfeit wares, Chinese 
organized crime groups, known colloquially as triads or tongs, are 
responsible for the importation of a considerable portion of the 
counterfeit trademarked goods that enter the United States, and for 
the distribution of such merchandise once it reaches American 
shores.43  Indeed, Canal Street functions as the hub of triad-
operated counterfeit goods distribution system with tendrils 
extending throughout the northeastern United States.44  The 
government’s seizure of $4 million worth of counterfeit 
trademarked luxury goods from four warehouses in Manhattan and 
Queens following the indictment of thirteen alleged members of 
Chinese gangs on a bevy of federal charges including counterfeit 
goods trafficking—and, for three of the defendants, RICO 
violations—is illustrative of the prominent role Chinese organized 
crime groups play in the counterfeit goods trade.45  The pervasive 
influence of Chinese criminal enterprises in the illicit counterfeit 
goods industry, however, does not function as a barrier to other 
structured criminal groups entering the trade. 
Organized crime collectives whose members are of other Asian 
ethnicities are also extensively involved in the illegal counterfeit 
goods industry.46  Every major Asian nationality appears to some 
extent on the organized crime landscape of the United States.47  
 
 41 See Andrew Yeh, The Complex Trade in Luxurious Fakes, FIN. TIMES ASIA 
(London), Apr. 19, 2006, at 10. 
 42 See id. 
 43 See Cassidy, supra note 36.  See generally Allessandra Galloni, Faked Out: As 
Luxury Goes Global, Knock-Off Merchants Follow, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2006, at A1. 
 44 See Debra D. Peterson, Criminal Counterfeiting and Component Parts: Closing the 
Perceived “Label Loophole,” 30 AIPLA Q.J. 457, 472 n.73 (2002) (citing a position of 
the International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition). 
 45 See Julia Preston, U.S. Charges 51 with Chinatown Smuggling, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 
2004, at B2; Press Release, U.S. Att’y for S. Dist. N.Y., U.S. Indicts 51 Chinese 
Organized Crime Figures in Massive Coordinated Sweep (Nov. 12, 2004) (on file with 
author), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/Press%20Releases/NOVEMBER04/ 
Chinese&20OC&20Indicmtent.pdf. 
 46 See HERBERT C. COVEY ET AL., JUVENILE GANGS 88 (2d ed. 1997). 
 47 Id. 
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Although not all Asian gangs are involved in the trafficking of 
counterfeit trademarked merchandise,48 the extensive participation 
of Korean organized crime groups in the illicit counterfeit goods 
trade is commensurate with the involution of Chinese criminal 
enterprises in the industry.49  In September 1995, federal law 
enforcement authorities, at the culmination of a two-and-a-half-
year investigation christened Operation Pipeline,50 raided 
warehouses in New York City and Los Angeles that served as the 
east and west coast distribution centers of a Korean organized 
crime syndicate deeply entrenched in the overseas manufacture and 
international trafficking of counterfeit trademarked goods.51  
Agents seized $27 million worth of counterfeit trademarked 
merchandise bearing brand names such as Polo and Chanel as 
prosecutors unsealed indictments charging forty-three members 
and associates of the counterfeiting ring, all Korean, with 
trafficking in counterfeit trademarked goods.52 
The substantial dollar value of the illicit goods recovered 
through the interdiction, and the sheer scope of the criminal 
counterfeiting collective unearthed, suffice in and of themselves to 
memorialize Operation Pipeline as a pivotal event in the 
government’s struggle to combat and curtail the trade in illegal 
 
 48 Members of the yakuza, the Japanese organized criminal syndicates, for example, 
make gambling, pornography, prostitution and drug distribution the focus of their 
unlawful activities, and shy away from trafficking in counterfeit trademarked goods. See 
Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, The Dark Side of Private Ordering: An Institutional 
and Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 66 (2000).  But cf. 
Imitating Property Is Theft, THE ECONOMIST, May 15, 2003, at 54 (noting that until Japan 
underwent industrialization, it was a breeding ground for counterfeit goods in the 1960s; 
suggesting that there is a direct correlation between industrialization and curtailing the 
manufacture of counterfeit merchandise). 
 49 See Boonghee Yoo & Seung-Hee Lee, The Buyers of Counterfeit Products in South 
Korea, 3 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 95, 97 (2004) (noting that according to the South Korean 
Customs Service, U.S. Customs agents interdict more counterfeit goods from South 
Korea than from any other country save China). 
 50 There is no connection between this investigation and the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) program of the same name implicated in the racial profiling of 
minorities by law enforcement officers. See Drug Enforcement Administration, 
Operations Pipeline and Convoy, http://www.dea.gov/programs/pipecon.htm (last visited 
Oct. 10, 2006) (describing the DEA operation). 
 51 George James, Agents Raid Production Line in Queens for Fake Labels, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 28, 1995, at B3. 
 52 Id. 
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counterfeit goods.53  Three distinct facets of the investigation, 
however, render the events surrounding Operation Pipeline worthy 
of further consideration.  First, it is of decisive import to note that 
without the insistent impetus of Chanel, it is exceedingly unlikely 
that federal prosecutors and law enforcement agencies would have 
embarked upon Operation Pipeline.54  The government initiated 
Operation Pipeline only after Chanel approached customs officials 
in Miami with detailed information about an ongoing 
counterfeiting operation producing and distributing counterfeit 
Chanel apparel and accessories.55  Once in possession of this 
information, Government authorities were no doubt emboldened in 
their pursuit of the counterfeiting syndicate by the approximately 
$1 million pecuniary contribution Chanel pledged to the 
investigation.56  Chanel’s decision to urge the government to take 
action against the counterfeiting collective, coupled with the 
company’s provision of financial assistance for the government’s 
investigation, is of immense consequence in that it represents one 
of the earliest documented instances of a private-sector company 
spearheading a criminal investigation into the counterfeiting of its 
trademarked products.57 
Second, the nature and characteristics of the items law 
enforcement agents recovered during their raids of the warehouses 
warrant careful attention.  While Asian manufacturers dispatched 
some of the merchandise seized by federal agents overseas with the 
labels and patches bearing the counterfeit trademarks already 
affixed, members of the counterfeiting syndicate also attached 
labels and patches bearing counterfeit trademarks to previously 
non-branded items once the wares reached the United States.58  In 
a factory in Flushing, one of the three locations law enforcement 
 
 53 See generally id. (noting the dollar amount seized, the number of people arrested, 
and that the seizure represented the U.S. government’s first successful attempt to track 
the flow of counterfeit goods from manufacturers, to distributors, and finally to retailers). 
 54 See id. 
 55 See id. 
 56 See PAUL R. PARADISE, TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING, PRODUCT PIRACY AND THE 
BILLION DOLLAR THREAT TO THE U.S. ECONOMY 256 (1999). 
 57 Lauren D. Amendolara, Note, Knocking Out Knock-Offs: Effectuating the 
Criminalization of Trafficking in Counterfeit Goods, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA 
& ENT. L.J. 789, 823 (2005). 
 58 James, supra note 51. 
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officers raided in Queens during Operation Pipeline, agents 
discovered computers loaded with elaborate graphics software 
capable of reproducing intricately detailed trademarked brand 
logos linked to two automated looms driving twenty-one 
embroidery machines apiece.59  In Los Angeles, federal agents 
unearthed the low-tech contingent of the counterfeiting collective 
when they came upon seventy-seven illegal immigrants in a 
sweatshop seated at sewing machines affixing counterfeit 
“Guess?” labels to jeans.60 
While the means by which counterfeiters affix labels bearing 
counterfeit trademarks to previously non-branded items is 
immaterial, the locale in which counterfeiters attach these labels is 
of considerable significance.61  Counterfeiters frequently import 
merchandise into the United States from Asia unlabeled and 
without branding, so that in the unlikely event that Customs and 
Border Protection (“CBP”) or Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (“ICE”) agents seize the goods at the border, the 
counterfeiters can escape criminal culpability by arguing that they 
cannot be guilty of trafficking in counterfeit trademarked goods 
since the merchandise they are brining into the country bears no 
trademarks.62  When a counterfeiter has computerized high-tech 
embroidery machines or an army of illegal immigrants and boxes 
of labels bearing counterfeit trademarks at his disposal, however, 
the added time and effort expended in affixing the counterfeit label 
of a trademarked brand to goods inside the United States scarcely 
qualifies as an inconvenience.63 
Waiting until goods make it past customs before attaching 
labels displaying counterfeit trademarks is only one of the 
multitude of tactics that counterfeiters employ to contravene the 
 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 See Tracie Rozhon, Handbag Maker Takes Aim at Knockoffs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 
2002, at C4. 
 62 See id. 
 63 For a discussion of the implications of Congress’ recent amendment of the 
Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, which now proscribes not only trafficking in 
goods to which labels and patches bearing counterfeit trademarks are affixed, but also 
trafficking in the labels and patches bearing the trademarks themselves, see infra Part III. 
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law.64  Another novel method of evading criminal sanctions 
favored by counterfeiters of designer handbags is roughly 
analogous to a false-bottomed suitcase: the manufacturer of a 
counterfeit handbag places a false layer of material over the bag to 
disguise its illicit origins on its journey from Asia to the United 
States, and the distributor of the bag simply removes this 
camouflage in preparation for sale.65  In one almost ludicrous 
instance, New Jersey law enforcement officials, with the assistance 
of drug-sniffing canines, discovered that an organized crime group 
had stitched heroin into the linings of counterfeit Louis Vuitton 
handbags, presumably in a fruitless attempt to secret both illegal 
products into the United States in one fell swoop.66  This discovery 
lends considerable credence to the contention that organized crime 
collectives involved in the counterfeit goods trade are effectively 
criminal conglomerates with diversified interests spread 
throughout a number of unlawful activities.67 
Operation Pipeline lastly marks the emergence of 
governmental recognition of the presence of a new type of 
diversified criminal enterprise in the United States: Korean 
organized crime syndicates.68  Korean organized crime groups 
trace their origins to the Korea of the 1940s, where they began as 
incipient political factions aiming to promote the Korean National 
Independence movement, which later became corrupt.69  
Beginning in 1950, the Korean government recognized the 
increasing prominence of indigenous organized crime collectives, 
known in Korea as “PAs,” and moved to classify such 
organizations into one of two categories: political or 
 
 64 See Cassidy, supra note 36. 
 65 See id. (citing Nancy Kratzer). 
 66 See S. REP. NO. 104-177, at 5 (1995). 
 67 See generally S. REP. NO. 104-177, at 3 (“[C]ounterfeiting has grown into a 
multibillion dollar, highly sophisticated illegal business, increasingly involving organized 
crime syndicates.”). 
 68 See James, supra note 51 (noting the acknowledgment of Robert E. Van Etten, 
Special Agent in Charge of Customs in New York, that Korean organized crime is an 
emerging problem in the United States). 
 69 DANIEL E. LUNGREN, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ORGANIZED CRIME IN 
CALIFORNIA: ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE 20 (1996). 
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entertainment.70  While in the past South Korean politicians 
employed the political PAs to infiltrate the government and rival 
political parties in an effort to undermine the balance of power and 
effect regime change, the use of political PAs to fulfill such 
Machiavellian aspirations has declined precipitously in recent 
years as the South Korean political landscape stabilized and the 
country’s economy blossomed.71  Today, although the 
entertainment PAs that control bars, nightclubs, and casinos in 
Korea are more prominent, political and entertainment PAs are still 
known, on occasion, to work together in pursuit of a shared goal.72 
In South Korea, PAs adhere to a rigid pyramidal organizational 
hierarchy analogous to the structure of a La Cosa Nostra (“LCN”) 
crime family.73  A boss, a second-in-command, or underboss, and 
an advisor acting as counsel, similar to a consigliere in LCN, sit at 
the top of the pyramid.74  Below them is a staff, comparable to 
LCN capos, which in turn precedes activity leaders, akin to LCN 
soldiers, and activity members, the counterparts of LCN 
associates.75  As the South Korean government initiated a 
crackdown on PAs in the 1980s and early 1990s, many PA leaders 
fled to other countries, including the United States, where they 
settled in communities with Korean enclaves such as Los Angeles 
and New York City.76  Once in the United States, former PA 
leaders founded and fostered organized criminal syndicates lacking 
the rigid pyramidal hierarchy of the Korean PAs.77  The Korean 
Power criminal collective is emblematic of the new breed of 
 
 70 BILL LOCKYER, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ORGANIZED CRIME IN 
CALIFORNIA: ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE 18 (2004). 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 James O. Finckenauer, INTERNATIONAL CENTER NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, LA 
COSA NOSTRA IN THE UNITED STATES, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/international/lcn.html 
(last visited Oct. 27, 2004). 
 74 LUNGREN, supra note 69, at 20. 
 75 Id. 
 76 See LOCKYER, supra note 70, at 18; LUNGREN, supra note 69, at 20; Alan Feur, 
5 Men Said to Be in Korean Mob Are Charged in Waiter’s Assault, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 
2001, at B8. 
 77 LUNGREN, supra note 69, at 20. 
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Korean organized crime group that emerged in the United States.78  
In contrast to both LCN and the traditional Korean PAs, Korean 
Power does not adhere to a pyramidal boss-captain-solder 
organizational structure.79  Instead, the syndicate bifurcates its 
constituency into Big Brothers, who plan and orchestrate the 
group’s criminal conduct, and Little Brothers, who actually 
perpetrate the organization’s criminal undertakings.80 
The decision of contemporary United States-based Korean 
organized crime factions to adopt an amorphous administrative 
framework in place of the rigid pyramidal organizational structure 
typical of classic organized crime operations may initially appear 
counterproductive. The wisdom of this choice, however, manifests 
itself upon closer inspection: by implementing a more malleable 
managerial framework, Korean organized crime factions avert the 
attentions of law enforcement agencies, thereby depriving such 
agencies of the intelligence they need in order to infiltrate these 
groups while allowing the criminal enterprises to continue 
unabated in their unlawful activities.  Because of the nebulous 
organizational framework embraced by the Korean organized 
crime syndicates, for example, the California Attorney General is 
able to proffer only a vague allusion that “[a]lthough structured, 
the various Korean organized crime groups in the United States do 
not have a single leader and vary in size from 20 to more than 100 
members.”81  While this empty declaration betrays the Attorney 
General’s lack of insight regarding the demographics of Korean 
organized crime collectives, his subsequent statement that 
“[c]rimes committed by the Korean organized crime group include 
prostitution, alien smuggling, gambling, business fraud, 
robbery . . . carjacking, and the counterfeiting of designer 
clothes,”82 implies that although he knows Korean groups are 
 
 78 The Korean Killers, also known simply as KK, are another example of the new type 
of Korean criminal organization that has arisen in the United States. See Michael D. 
Shear, Officials Seek Increase in Crime-Fighting Funds; Youth Gangs Cited as a 
Growing Problem, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 1995, at V01 (noting that the Korean Killers 
have a nationwide presence). 
 79 Feur, supra note 76. 
 80 Id. 
 81 LUNGREN, supra note 69, at 21. 
 82 Id. (emphasis added). 
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committing certain crimes, he is at a loss regarding which factions 
are perpetrating particular acts.  The syndicates could not ask for 
anything more. 
Like Korean criminal collectives, Vietnamese gangs often seek 
to steer clear of gaining any sort of notoriety amongst the general 
public, and may even refuse to adopt gang names in an effort to 
avoid raising the suspicions of law enforcement authorities.83  
Avoidance of the limelight was apparently not, however, a priority 
for the Born to Kill (“BTK”) gang, a Vietnamese criminal 
syndicate also known as the Canal Boys that held sway over much 
of Lower Manhattan’s Chinatown in the late 1980s and early 
1990s.84  David Thai, the former ringleader of the BTK gang 
presently serving three consecutive life sentences in federal prison, 
claims that the gang reaped millions of dollars in profits from 
selling counterfeit Rolex and Cartier watches.85  The BTK gang 
promptly put the proceeds from these counterfeit timepiece sales to 
use bankrolling a cornucopia of criminal activities including 
robbery, extortion, and murder, perpetrated in locales as distant 
from Chinatown as Doraville, Georgia.86 
Counterfeiters can reap substantial sums of money with 
commensurately little risk through the trafficking, distribution, and 
sale of counterfeit goods; and can divert profits to other criminal 
activities.  Thus, the counterfeit goods industry is attractive not 
only to conventional organized crime groups, but also to terrorist 
organizations and rogue nations.87  Indeed, the highest-ranking 
official at Interpol contends that both Hezbollah and Al Qaeda 
 
 83 James Diego Vigil & Steve Chong Yun, Vietnamese Youth Gangs in Southern 
California, in GANGS IN AMERICA, 146, 159 (C. Ronald Huff ed., 1990). 
 84 See generally United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 794–800 (2d Cir. 1994) (describing 
the various criminal activities of BTK and its members through 1980s and 1990s). 
 85 See S. REP. NO. 104-77, at 4–5 (1995). 
 86 See Thai, 29 F.3d at 794–800; S. REP. NO. 104-77, at 6. 
 87 See Counterfeiting and Theft of Tangible Intellectual Property: Challenges and 
Solutions: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 1 (2004) 
(statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary), 
available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/member_statement.cfm?id=1119&wit_id=103 
(asserting that terrorist groups launder money from trafficking in counterfeit goods to 
fund criminal activities); Peter Navarro, Op-Ed., Only China, Not U.S., Can Rein in N. 
Korea, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 12, 2006, at C29 (stating that North Korea is immune from UN 
sanctions because of trafficking in counterfeit goods). 
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have turned to trafficking in counterfeit goods to generate 
revenue.88  Organized crime syndicates inherently adopt self-
protective measures to ward off government seizure of their goods 
and arrest of their personnel as a component of their overarching 
goal of maximizing their illicit profits by remaining in the 
counterfeit goods trade as long as possible.89  Conversely, terrorist 
cells immersed in the counterfeit merchandise industry presumably 
intend to remain in the trade only for a limited time, until they sell 
the finite quantity of counterfeit goods necessary to meet their 
fundraising threshold.  A terrorist organization performing a cost-
benefit analysis prior to deciding whether to enter the counterfeit 
goods trade, then, would arrive at a risk-reward dichotomy even 
more disproportionate than those reached by organized crime 
groups, for terrorist organizations, concerned as they are only with 
short-term gains, can wholly disregard any long-term risks. 
Since the ample pecuniary rewards ready for the taking in the 
counterfeit goods industry radically outweigh the trivial odds of 
arrest, prosecution, and seizure of the illicit merchandise, let alone 
the infinitesimal probability that the government will uncover the 
terrorists’ scheme, it is unsurprising that terrorist organizations 
have already made full and fruitful use of the worldwide trade in 
counterfeit goods to finance a portion of at least one attack against 
the United States.90  Terrorists funded their 1993 attack on the 
World Trade Center at least in part with profits derived from a 
counterfeit t-shirt vending operation.91  Some individuals, typically 
advocates for vigorous enforcement of trademark owners’ rights 
such as Roslyn A. Mazer, an Associate Deputy Attorney General 
in the Clinton Administration,92 assert that the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001 were also funded, at least in part, by sales of 
 
 88 Johnston, supra note 38 (noting Secretary General of Interpol Ronald K. Noble’s 
testimony on the involvement of terrorist organizations in the counterfeit goods trade). 
 89 For examples of such self-protective measures, see supra notes 59–62 and 
accompanying text. 
 90 See Roslyn A. Mazer, From T-Shirts to Terrorism: That Fake Nike Swoosh May Be 
Helping to Fund Bin Laden’s Network, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2001, at B2; Betsy 
Streisand, Jingle All the Way?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 16, 2002, at 36. 
 91 Mazer, supra note 90; Streisand, supra note 90. 
 92 Julian E. Barnes, Fake Goods are Flowing Under the Radar, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 
2001, § 3, at 34. 
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counterfeit computer software in Ciudad del Este, Paraguay, a 
South American hotbed of counterfeiting and piracy activity.93  
While Ms. Mazer’s assertion regarding the funding of the 
September 11 attacks lacks definitive substantiation, and her 
remarks have drawn considerable rebuke from critics,94 these 
shortcomings do not displace the fact that trafficking in counterfeit 
consumer goods is fast becoming the favored method of 
fundraising for a number of terrorist organizations, and this trend 
shows no signs of abating.95 
The opportunities for pecuniary gain in the counterfeit goods 
trade are so great that even the rogue regime in North Korea, 
confronted with the prospect of diminishing revenue streams as 
sales from its once lucrative arm business begin to dry up, has 
entered the fray.  Pyongyang now boasts a booming trade in 
counterfeit cigarettes, pharmaceuticals and currency.96  American 
officials estimate that North Korea now earns $500 million 
annually from trafficking in counterfeit merchandise.97  North 
Korea’s counterfeiting activities, however, are wholly distinct from 
those of the Korean organized crime syndicates operating within 
the United States, which maintain ties with South Korea as part of 
their supply chains.98  North Korea functions on an entirely 
different plane.  Apparently disinterested in dabbling in counterfeit 
luxury goods, North Korea’s focus on counterfeiting cigarettes, 
pharmaceuticals, and good old-fashioned cash meshes with its 
hardscrabble, iconoclastic image.99  North Korea is the first 
 
 93 Mazer, supra note 90. 
 94 See Naomi Klein, Comment & Analysis: McWorld & Jihad, THE GUARDIAN 
(London), Oct. 5, 2001 (suggesting that Ms. Mazer’s assertions stem from disingenuous 
political opportunism). 
 95 See Johnston, supra note 38 (noting Secretary General of Interpol Ronald K. Noble’s 
testimony on the involvement of terrorist organizations in the counterfeit goods trade). 
 96 See Jay Solomon & Gordon Fairclough, North Korea’s Counterfeit Goods 
Targeted—U.S. Seeks to Curb Illicit Business in Cigarettes, Drugs, Currency to Augment 
Diplomacy, WALL. ST. J., June 1, 2005, at A4. 
 97 Id. 
 98 See generally LOCKYER, supra note 70, at 18 (discussing South Korean Organized 
Crime). 
 99 See id. 
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governmental regime since Nazi Germany that has attempted to 
make money by counterfeiting American currency.100 
Since North Korea is a sovereign national entity, albeit a 
ruthless dictatorship, one might be disinclined to brand the entire 
country as a criminal enterprise.  American officials, however, 
appear to have no such qualms.101  The United States Ambassador 
to South Korea has repeatedly referred to the North as a “criminal 
regime,”102 while an expert on negotiation and Korean policy 
testified before a Senate subcommittee that the North Korean 
Government “is not unlike an organized crime family, but . . . 
characterized by a higher degree of ruthlessness carried out on a 
scale that dwarfs the mafia’s reach,” and that “the North Korean 
‘state’ is actually a group of thugs.”103  North Korea, then, is in the 
eyes of the United States government, an organized crime 
syndicate expanded to a hyperbolic extreme.  The government, 
however, could turn much of its vitriolic concern about North 
Korea to significantly better use elsewhere.  The United States 
government is simply not capable of shuttering North Korea’s 
counterfeiting industries, and since the government, over which 
Kim Jong-Il holds unbridled power, controls all of the nation’s 
industries, any effort to prosecute North Korean counterfeiting out 
of existence would prove unworkable. 
If the government redirected even a small fraction of the 
attention it expends on North Korea to eradicating the counterfeit 
goods trade within the United States, it would begin to see 
perceptible reductions in counterfeit goods trafficking activity 
almost immediately.  In contrast to the North Korean government, 
the Asian organized crime syndicates that dominate the 
importation and wholesale distribution of counterfeit goods in 
America are not immune to prosecution.  The statutory provisions 
proscribing trafficking in counterfeit goods presently in force at 
 
 100 See James Brooke, Talks Stalled, U.S. Envoy Matches Insults of North Korea, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 15, 2005, at A10. 
 101 See id. 
 102 Id. (quoting Ambassador Alexander Vershbow). 
 103 How North Korea Funds Its Regime: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fed. Fin. 
Mgmt, Govt. Info., & Int’l Sec. of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Govt’l Aff., 109th 
Cong. 1–2 (2006) (statement of Chuck Downs, Author, OVER THE LINE: NORTH KOREA’S 
NEGOTIATING STRATEGY). 
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both the state and federal levels, although not flawless, are 
sufficient to effectuate a sea change in the counterfeit goods trade 
in the United States when applied diligently, expeditiously and 
evenhandedly.  To date, however, prosecutors and law 
enforcement agencies have lacked the resolve to maximize the 
effectiveness of these laws by applying them consistently and 
creatively. 
III. FEDERAL STATUTES PROVIDE PROSECUTORS WITH POTENT 
WEAPONS TO COMBAT COUNTERFEITING 
The United States Constitution expressly provides for the 
protection of patents and copyrights.104  Congress did not enact any 
comprehensive legislation pertaining to trademarks, however, until 
it passed the Trademark Act of 1870.105  While this statute afforded 
lawful owners of trademarks the ability to seek injunctive relief 
and money damages from violators,106 Congress did not 
criminalize trademark counterfeiting until it passed the Penal Act 
of 1876,107 which threatened violators with fines and a two-year 
maximum prison sentence upon conviction.108  The Supreme Court 
dashed these initial congressional efforts to protect trademarks and 
thwart counterfeiting when it declared in The Trade-Mark Cases 
that since federal control of trademarks was an “exercise of a 
power not confided to Congress,” all federal statutes regulating 
trademarks were unconstitutional.109  Congress responded 
cautiously with the Trademark Act of 1881,110 which, because it 
only policed the use of trademarks in commerce with foreign 
nations or Indian tribes, was sure to pass muster under the 
 
 104 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 105 Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, §§ 77–84, 16 Stat. 198, 210–12, invalidated by The 
Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879). See Brian J. Kearney, The Trademark 
Counterfeiting Act of 1984: A Sensible Response to the Ills of Commercial 
Counterfeiting, 14 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 115, 125 (1985–1986). 
 106 See Act of July 8, 1870 § 79. 
 107 Act of Aug. 14, 1876, ch. 274, § 1, 19 Stat. 141, invalidated by The Trade-Mark 
Cases, 100 U.S. 82. 
 108 See id. 
 109 See The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 97–99. 
 110 Act of Mar. 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502. 
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Commerce Clause.111  This legislation was followed by the 
Trademark Act of 1905,112 which, having been amended sixteen 
times by the 1930s,113 came to resemble “a crazy quilt of 
modifications.”114  Congress replaced this hodgepodge with a 
cohesive scheme for the federal regulation and protection of 
trademarks when it passed the Lanham Act, which remains the 
cornerstone of federal trademark law, in 1946.115 
The Lanham Act supplies lawful trademark owners with an 
arsenal of legal weapons which they may employ against 
counterfeiters including forfeiture of profits to the rightful 
trademark owner; seizure and destruction of all counterfeit 
merchandise, as well as the means and machinery used to produce 
such goods; court costs and attorneys’ fees; and compensatory 
treble damages to remedy past trademark counterfeiting.116  The 
Lanham Act does not, however, criminalize trafficking in 
counterfeit trademarked goods.117  In fact, between the Supreme 
Court’s invalidation of all federal statutes regulating trademarks in 
its 1879 ruling in The Trade-mark Cases118 and Congress’ 
enactment of criminal penalties for trafficking in phonograph 
records bearing forged or counterfeit labels in 1962,119 no criminal 
prohibitions on trafficking in counterfeit trademarked goods 
existed at the federal level.  By 1984, however, Congress 
recognized that the burgeoning trade in counterfeit goods in 
America was largely attributable to the fact that there were 
“virtually no criminal penalties for the sale of goods and services 
through the use of false trademarks,”120 and counterfeiters viewed 
“potential civil penalties simply as a cost of doing their illegal 
 
 111 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 112 Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724. 
 113 See Kearney, supra note 103, at 129. 
 114 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 5:3 (4th ed. 2001). 
 115 Lanham Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1129 (2000)). 
 116 See PARADISE, supra note 56, at 8. 
 117 See Kearney, supra note 103, at 131. 
 118 100 U.S. 82, 97-99 (1879). 
 119 See Act of Oct. 9, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-773, § 1, 76 Stat. 775 (codified as amended 
at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2318 (West 2006)). 
 120 S. REP. NO. 98-526, at 1 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3627, 3627. 
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business.”121  Consequently, Congress passed the 1984 Act122 as 
part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984123 to combat 
counterfeiters emboldened by the lack of criminal sanctions 
proscribing trafficking in counterfeit merchandise and unfazed by 
the potential of civil penalties.124 
The 1984 Act, as initially enacted, subjected anyone who 
“intentionally traffics or attempts to traffic in goods or services and 
knowingly uses a counterfeit mark on or in connection with such 
goods or services” to a fine of no more than $250,000 and a prison 
sentence no longer than five years, or both.125  If the offender was 
an entity other than an individual, such as an organized crime 
syndicate or a corporation, it was subject to a maximum fine of 
$1 million.126  Prior convictions for trafficking in counterfeit goods 
raised the maximum sentence for an individual to a $1 million fine, 
a fifteen year prison sentence, or both, and the maximum fine for 
an entity other than an individual to $5 million.127  The civil 
portions of the 1984 Act simultaneously enabled lawful trademark 
owners to exact stiffer penalties from counterfeiters by mandating 
that, absent an explicit finding of extenuating circumstances, trial 
court judges must impose treble damages upon defendants 
following conviction.128  The civil segments also allowed 
trademark owners to seek ex parte seizures of counterfeit goods 
bearing their trademarks executed via unannounced raids on 
locations of known counterfeit goods trafficking activity, and 
authorized judges to grant such applications if trademark owners 
 
 121 Id. at 5, as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3631. 
 122 Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 1501–1503, 
98 Stat. 1976, 2178–83 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2320 & 15 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 1116–1118 (West 2006)). 
 123 Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
18 U.S.C.). 
 124 See S. REP. NO. 98-526, at 1, as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3627. 
 125 Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1502, 98 Stat. 2178, 2178 (current version at 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 2320(a) (West 2006)). 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 See Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1503, 98 Stat. 2178, 2182–83 (current version at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1117(b) (West 2006)). 
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were able to demonstrate a unique and pressing need for such 
seizures.129 
Despite the initial criminal and heightened civil sanctions 
imposed by the 1984 Act, the trade in counterfeit goods in the 
United States continued to proliferate at such a rapid rate that only 
twelve years later, Congress deemed its previous anti-
counterfeiting legislation “an inadequate remedy for the explosive 
growth of criminal commercial counterfeiting.”130  Congress 
reasoned that stiffer penalties were needed because the 1984 Act 
took into account neither rapid technological advances that 
rendered the counterfeiting of trademarked goods easier and more 
lucrative, nor “the extent to which organized crime syndicates, 
often operating on an international level, would become directly 
involved in the manufacturing, distributing, selling, and financing 
of counterfeit products.”131  Congress initially moved to heighten 
penalties somewhat surreptitiously when it increased the criminal 
sanctions faced by defendants convicted of trafficking in 
counterfeit trademarked goods under 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a) as part 
of its passage of the massive Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994.132  In the wake of these increases 
individual defendants with no prior convictions for trademark 
counterfeiting now face up to $2 million in fines, and a prison 
sentence to up to ten years, or both, while fines of up to $5 million 
await organizational offenders.133  Predicate individual offenders 
now face a maximum fine of $5 million and the potential of a 
 
 129 See Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1503, 98 Stat. 2178, 2180–82 (current version at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1116 (West 2006)). 
 130 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-556, at 2 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1074, 
1075.  Congress noted that while losses attributable to counterfeiting totaled $5.5 billion 
in 1982, this figure had ballooned to $200 billion by 1995. See S. REP. NO. 104-177, at 3 
(1995). 
 131 S. REP. NO. 104-177, at 3. 
 132 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 
Stat. 1796 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 27 U.S.C. 
and 42 U.S.C.). 
 133 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, sec. 
320104, § 2320(a), 108 Stat. 1796, 2110 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2320 
(West 2006)). 
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twenty-year prison term, or both, while non-individual defendants 
now meet with fines of up $15 million.134 
Congress also made use of the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994 to quietly append trafficking in 
counterfeit trademarked goods in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2320 to 
the laundry list of “specified unlawful activities” that can 
potentially trigger a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 
1957, the statutory provisions of the Money Laundering Act.135  
The first of the two money laundering statutes, § 1956, 
criminalizes conducting or attempting to conduct a financial 
transaction when the offender knows the property involved in the 
transaction represents proceeds derived from some form of 
unlawful activity and either intends “to promote the carrying on of 
specified unlawful activity” through the transaction, or commit tax 
evasion or fraud; or knows that the transaction is designed to 
“conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the 
ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful 
activity,” or to avoid federal or state currency reporting 
requirements.136  The second federal money laundering statute, 
§ 1957, makes it illegal to knowingly engage “in a monetary 
transaction in criminally derived property [that is] of a value 
greater than $10,000 and is derived from” one or more of the 
crimes on the laundry list of specified unlawful activities, which 
includes trafficking in counterfeit goods and services in violation 
of § 2320.137  The term “monetary transaction” includes all 
pecuniary activity conducted through financial institutions except 
for transactions necessary to preserve a criminal defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.138 
The inclusion of trafficking in counterfeit trademarked goods 
and services in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2320 in the laundry list of 
 
 134 Id. 
 135 See Pub. L. No. 103-322, sec. 320104, § 1956(c)(7)(D), 108 Stat. 1796, 2111 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(D) (2000)). 
 136 See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (2000). 
 137 See 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a) (2000).  Other crimes on the laundry list include destruction 
of aircraft; violence at international airports; threatening a federal official; concealing 
assets; firearms trafficking; financing terrorism; and a multitude to other felonies. See 
18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(D) (2000). 
 138 See 18 U.S.C. § 1957(f)(1) (2000). 
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offenses constituting “specified unlawful activity” for the purposes 
of the money laundering statutes threatens counterfeit goods 
traffickers with the prospect of prison sentences of up to twenty 
years in length, even in the case of a first offense.139  Federal 
prosecutors, for example, can now charge gang members whom 
they allege employed profits derived from extortion to finance 
trafficking in counterfeit goods not only with trafficking in 
counterfeit goods in violation of § 2320, but also with money 
laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1).  The conduct involved in 
the financial transaction required to charge a violation of 
§ 1956(a)(1), however, need not be this reprehensible.  In fact, it 
need not even be criminal to constitute money laundering.  An 
individual, whether operating alone or as part of an organized 
criminal syndicate, who uses proceeds reaped from trafficking in 
counterfeit Louis Vuitton handbags to purchase legitimate Louis 
Vuitton goods for his own personal enjoyment, for example, could 
be found guilty of money laundering under § 1956(a)(1), so long as 
he intends for his purchase of the legitimate merchandise to 
conceal the fact that his profits resulted from trafficking in 
counterfeit goods.140  He faces the possibility of spending as many 
as twenty years in federal prison upon conviction.141 
Congress, however, believed that in order to substantially 
curtail the proliferation of the counterfeit goods trade, it needed to 
go beyond increasing the penalties for violating the criminal 
provisions of the 1984 Act and including trafficking in counterfeit 
goods on the laundry list of specified unlawful activities that 
enables federal prosecutors to bring charges under the money 
laundering statutes.142  Consequently, Congress enacted the 
Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996 (“1996 Act”) 
to further increase the civil and criminal penalties for trafficking in 
 
 139 See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1). 
 140 The money laundering statute does not, however, criminalize the mere spending of 
money gained through a specified unlawful activity from the laundry list. See United 
States v. Sanders, 929 F.2d 1466, 1472 (10th Cir. 1991).  Rather, “by the express terms of 
the statute, a design to conceal or disguise the source or nature of the proceeds is a 
necessary element for a money laundering conviction.” Id. 
 141 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1). 
 142 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-556, at 2 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1074, 
1075. 
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counterfeit goods and to diversify the statutory conduits through 
which federal prosecutors and law enforcement authorities can 
attack individuals and enterprises enmeshed in this illicit 
industry.143  The 1996 Act amended the damages provisions of the 
Lanham Act by affording trademark owners the option of 
recovering statutory damages from counterfeiters prior to final 
judgment;144 provided for the assessment of civil fines against 
individuals and entities found to have aided and abetted the 
importation of counterfeit goods;145 and authorized the civil 
forfeiture of vessels, vehicles, and aircraft used to facilitate 
trafficking in counterfeit merchandise.146  The 1996 Act is most 
notable, however, for classifying trafficking in counterfeit goods in 
violation of § 2320 as a “racketeering activity” constituting a 
predicate offense subject to prosecution or civil suit under 
RICO.147 
Consequently, federal law now construes individuals and 
organized criminal collectives who engage in patterns of 
trafficking in counterfeit goods as racketeers.148  Upon conviction 
of violating a criminal RICO provision, offenders are subject to a 
prison sentence of no more than twenty years and a maximum fine 
of twice the gross profits or other proceeds of the offenders’ 
racketeering activity.149  The statute also orders mandatory 
forfeiture of any interest the offender acquired or maintained 
through the RICO violation, including profits, proceeds and 
income thereof; any interest the offender has in an enterprise used 
 
 143 See Pub. L. No. 104-153, 110 Stat. 1386 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 15 U.S.C., 17 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 19 U.S.C. and 49 U.S.C.). 
 144 See Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-153, sec. 
7, § 1117, 110 Stat. 1386, 1388 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1117(c) (2006)). 
 145 See Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-153, sec. 
10, § 1526, 110 Stat. 1386, 1388–89 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.A. § 1526(f) 
(2006)). 
 146 See Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-153, sec. 
13, § 80302, 110 Stat. 1386, 1389–90 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 80302 
(2000)). 
 147 See Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-153, sec. 
3, § 1961(a)(3), 110 Stat. 1386, 1386 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) 
(2000)).  For a discussion of the ability of trademark owners to sue counterfeiters under 
18 U.S.C. § 1964, RICO’s civil remedies provision, see infra Part V. 
 148 See id. 
 149 See 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (2000). 
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to effectuate the RICO violation; and any contractual right that 
enabled the offender to wield influence over an enterprise used to 
violate RICO.150  The statute’s extensive forfeiture provisions 
constitute one of the most appealing aspects of employing RICO 
against traffickers of counterfeit goods.  Indeed, Congress noted 
with enthusiasm that “RICO permits law enforcement agents to 
seize nonmonetary personal and real estate assets connected with 
the criminal enterprise in addition to the counterfeit goods.”151  
This is a vital provision in the context of curtailing the counterfeit 
goods trade, because it enables federal agents not only to seize 
counterfeiters’ supplies of illicit goods, but also to eradicate the 
means upon which counterfeiters rely for future production.152 
Any offender, whether individual or organizational, now 
violates 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) when the offender employs profits 
obtained through a pattern of trafficking in counterfeit goods to 
establish an enterprise engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, 
even if such an enterprise is not unlawful in and of itself, and 
violates § 1962(b) when the offender uses profits netted through a 
pattern of trafficking in counterfeit goods to maintain an interest in 
such a venture.153  Individual offenders employed by or associated 
with an enterprise engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, 
including by definition any organized crime syndicates involved 
with the importation of counterfeit goods from Asia, violate 
§ 1962(c) when they conduct the affairs of such an enterprise 
through a pattern of trafficking in counterfeit goods.154  In order to 
secure a conviction for conspiring to violate RICO under 
§ 1962(d), prosecutors need not prove that at least one of the 
conspirators committed an overt act to effectuate the object of the 
 
 150 See id. 
 151 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-556, at 7 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1074, 
1079–80. 
 152 Congress views the looming prospect of expansive civil forfeiture provisions as so 
crucial to curtailing the counterfeit goods trade that it included such provisions in § 2320 
with its recent amendment of that statute. See Stop Counterfeiting in Manufactured 
Goods Act, Pub. L. No. 109-181, sec. 1–2, § 2320, 120 Stat. 285, 285 (2006) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2320 (West 2006)). 
 153 See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2000). 
 154 See id. 
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conspiracy as is required under the general conspiracy statute.155  
Nor must prosecutors demonstrate that a conspirator committed or 
agreed to commit the two predicate acts necessary to create the 
pattern of racketeering activity required for a RICO conviction in 
order to secure a conviction for conspiracy to violate RICO.156  In 
order to obtain a conviction for conspiracy to violate RICO, 
prosecutors must establish only that an offender embraced the goal 
of furthering an illicit enterprise, which, if completed, would fulfill 
the requirements of a substantive RICO offense.157 
While the apparent ease of securing a conviction for conspiring 
to violate RICO might lead one to conclude that the government 
could all but eradicate the counterfeit goods trade in the United 
States by charging everyone on the distribution chain, from street-
level vendors upwards, under § 1962(d), the intricacies of applying 
the RICO provisions belie such a position.  Prosecutions of 
traffickers of counterfeit goods under RICO are bound by the same 
statutory encumbrances that plague all RICO actions, which 
perhaps explains the scant record of criminal prosecutions of 
traffickers of counterfeit goods under RICO.158  The greatest 
hurdle prosecutors must surmount in all RICO actions is the 
establishing of the existence of a pattern of racketeering activity.  
Section 1961 merely states that a pattern requires at least two acts 
of racketeering activity to occur within ten years of one another.159  
The Supreme Court has held “that to prove a pattern of 
racketeering activity a plaintiff or prosecutor must show that the 
racketeering predicates are related, and that they amount to or pose 
a threat of continued criminal activity.”160 
This governing two-pronged formulation for determining the 
existence of a pattern of racketeering activity, commonly referred 
 
 155 See Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 63 (1997).  See also 18 U.S.C. § 371 (the 
general conspiracy statute). 
 156 See Salinas, 522 U.S. at 64. 
 157 See id. at 65. 
 158 Despite the fact that trafficking in counterfeit goods and services in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 2320 (West 2006) has been a predicate violation for RICO purposes for ten 
years, there are to date no cases addressing the prosecution of traffickers of counterfeit 
goods under RICO provisions present in the federal record. 
 159 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2000). 
 160 H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989). 
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as the “continuity plus relationship test,” while still purposefully 
amorphous, demarcates approximate boundaries of what 
constitutes a pattern.161  Under this conceptualization, while a 
group of otherwise legitimate business owners who collaborate to 
import a single container filled with counterfeit goods on one 
occasion fails to meet the continuity prong, a loose assemblage of 
criminals, some of whom traffic in counterfeit goods while others 
perpetrate environmental crimes, falls short of meeting the 
relationship requirement.162  At the opposite end of the spectrum, 
an organized criminal syndicate that systematically imports and 
distributes shipments of counterfeit goods and uses the profits it 
derives from this illicit activity to establish underground gambling 
operations clearly fulfills both prongs of the continuity-plus-
relationship test.163  In practice, however, the existence of a pattern 
of racketeering activity is rarely so clear-cut.  Moreover, to attain a 
criminal § 1962(c) conviction, prosecutors must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that an enterprise existed as laid out in the 
indictment; that the enterprise influenced interstate commerce; that 
the defendant was associated with the enterprise; and that the 
defendant knowingly participated in the conduct of the enterprise 
through a pattern of racketeering activity.164  These burdensome 
requirements dissuade prosecutors from instituting criminal RICO 
actions against traffickers of counterfeit goods, particularly in light 
of the ready availability of § 2320, a statute specifically tailored to 
attack the ills of the counterfeit goods industry, that subsequent to 
its recent amendment by Congress’ through the Stop 
Counterfeiting in Manufactured Goods Act (“Stop Act”),165 rivals 
RICO in potency. 
Amidst its zealous efforts to increase the penalties for 
trafficking in counterfeit goods and its enactment of various 
schemes aimed at diversifying the statutory avenues through which 
prosecutors and law enforcement agencies could pursue and thwart 
 
 161 See id. 
 162 See id. at 242–43. 
 163 See id. 
 164 See United States v. Perholtz, 842 F.2d 343, 354 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 165 Pub. L. No. 109-181, sec. 1–2, § 2320, 120 Stat. 285, 285 (2006) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2320 (West 2006)). 
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counterfeit goods traffickers, Congress for a time lost sight of 
§ 2320, the only federal statute that exists specifically to counteract 
counterfeiting.  When Congress originally enacted § 2320 as the 
criminal component of the 1984 Act,166 the statute subjected 
anyone who “intentionally traffics or attempts to traffic in goods or 
services and knowingly uses a counterfeit mark on or in 
connection with such goods or services” to the potential of fines 
and incarceration following conviction.167  This portion of § 2320 
retained its original language until the holding of the Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Giles168 
persuaded Congress to redouble its focus on § 2320 and precipitate 
a wholesale reinvention of the statute through its execution of the 
Stop Act.169 
Donald Ralph “Sonny” Giles owned a business named 
“Fabulous Fakes,” which predictably specialized in selling look-
alike versions of branded luxury goods at deeply discounted 
prices.170  Giles also sold certain items in bulk at wholesale prices, 
such as so-called patch sets displaying the trademarked logo of 
Dooney & Bourke, an American luxury goods purveyor and 
manufacturer of high-end handbags, luggage and other fashion 
accessories.171  The patch sets Giles sold were composed of a 
leather patch and a gold medallion, both of which featured the 
Dooney & Bourke logo, accompanied by a leather strap used to 
affix the medallion to a handbag.172  Once the recipient of a patch 
set affixed the leather patch bearing Dooney & Bourke’s logo onto 
a generic, non-branded purse or piece of luggage, it would appear 
that Dooney & Bourke manufactured the generic item.173  Upon 
learning of Giles’ patch set bulk sales, FBI agents established an 
 
 166 Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 1501–1503, 98 
Stat. 1976, 2178–83 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2320 & 15 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 1116–1118 (West 2006)). 
 167 Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1502, 98 Stat. 2178, 
2178 (current version at 18 U.S.C.A § 2320 (West 2006)) (emphasis added). 
 168 213 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 169 Pub. L. No. 109-181, sec. 1–2, § 2320, 120 Stat. 285, 285 (2006) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2320 (West 2006)). 
 170 Giles, 213 F.3d at 1248. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. 
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undercover operation and used a confidential informant to 
purchase a bulk order of patch sets.174  After only two exchanges 
with the informant, Fabulous Fakes shipped 1,000 patch sets 
displaying the Dooney and Bourke logo to Oklahoma, where the 
FBI seized them.175  Giles was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2320 following a jury trial.176  The Tenth Circuit, however, 
reversed Giles’ conviction, holding that the patch sets were not 
goods under § 2320, and that § 2320 does not proscribe trafficking 
in counterfeit labels when the labels are not used on or in 
connection with other goods.177 
If the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Giles did not provoke the ire 
of the legislature, it certainly piqued their attention.  Prior to Giles, 
Congress’ chief strategy in its battle against counterfeit goods 
trafficking was to include violations of § 2320 as predicate 
offenses in laundry list statutes known for their stiff fines and 
lengthy prison sentences—such as RICO178 and the Money 
Laundering Act179—with the hope that such inclusions would 
discourage traffickers from continuing to ply the counterfeit goods 
trade.  Traffickers, however, appreciating that the severity of 
potential penalties is meaningless when one is all but certain not to 
be caught, proved to be undaunted by the ominous range of statutes 
under which the government hypothetically could, but in practice 
did not, prosecute.180  As even its own reports grudgingly admit, 
Congress’ dalliances with combating counterfeit goods trafficking 
through statutes packing stiff penalties but suffering from only 
tangential relation to the counterfeit merchandise industry were 
ineffective in the overall fight against trademark counterfeiting.181  
It took the Tenth Circuit’s de facto invalidation of § 2320 in 
Giles,182 however, for Congress to recognize that in attempting to 
 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. at 1251–53. 
 178 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2000). 
 179 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–1957 (2000). 
 180 See Christopher M. Dolan, Fits Over Counterfeiting: Legislative Accomplishments 
and Directions, 27 AIPLA Q.J. 233, 253 (1999). 
 181 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-556, at 1–2 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1074, 1074–75. 
 182 See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
COCKS_GALLEYPROOF_120106.DOC 1/23/2007  4:42 PM 
2007 COUNTERFEIT GOODS 533 
eradicate the counterfeit goods trade, deterrence is attained not 
through the severity of an improbable punishment, but through the 
certainty of a likely sanction.183 
In the wake of Giles, Congress radically reassessed the manner 
in which it fought the proliferation of the counterfeit goods trade 
through federal criminal legislation and redoubled its attention to 
§ 2320.184  The Stop Act constitutes the culmination of Congress’ 
reconstruction of the federal statutory enforcement scheme 
proscribing trafficking in counterfeit goods. 185  The new, 
improved, and more potent § 2320 handily dispenses with the 
issues raised by the Tenth Circuit in Giles in its first section, which 
includes a new clause threatening any offender who “intentionally 
traffics or attempts to traffic in labels, patches, stickers, wrappers, 
badges, emblems, boxes, containers, cans, cases, hangtags, 
documentation, or packaging of any type or nature, knowing that a 
counterfeit mark has been applied thereto”186 with the heightened 
fines and prison sentences enacted under the Violent Crime 
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.187  This new addition 
to § 2320, if rigorously enforced, has the ability to markedly hinder 
the operations counterfeiters who attempt to skirt the law by 
importing apparel into the United States unbranded only to affix 
labeling bearing counterfeit trademarks on American soil, without 
resorting to the severe and untenable tactic of outlawing the 
importation of unbranded products.  The clause effects this aim by 
heeding the call of a number of critics to criminalize trafficking in 
the counterfeit marks themselves, irrespective of whether they are 
attached to other goods.188 
Congress’ modifications of § 2320 through the Stop Act, 
however, do not end with this provision.  To the contrary, the Stop 
Act appends to § 2320 a civil forfeiture scheme triggered upon 
 
 183 See Dolan, supra note 180, at 253. 
 184 See Pub. L. No. 109-181, sec. 1–2, § 2320, 120 Stat. 285, 285 (2006) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2320 (West 2006)). 
 185 Id. 
 186 Pub. L. No. 109-181, sec. 1–2, § 2320, 120 Stat. 285, 285 (2006) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2320(a) (West 2006)). 
 187 Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
18 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 27 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). 
 188 See, e.g., Amendolara, supra note 57, at 829. 
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conviction that surpasses RICO’s in severity.189  Under the updated 
statute, once a defendant is convicted of violating § 2320, the court 
is required by law to impose upon the defendant, in addition to any 
fine or prison sentence, mandatory civil forfeiture of any property 
amounting to or derived from any proceeds obtained through 
trafficking in counterfeit goods, such as a house; any property 
used, or intended to be used, to traffic in, or facilitate, aid or abet 
the trafficking of counterfeit goods, such as a vehicle; and any 
property that displays or consists of a counterfeit trademark.190  It 
is not difficult to imagine these provisions of the updated § 2320, 
which do not contain a mercy clause for extenuating 
circumstances, forcing a defendant to relinquish all his worldly 
possessions upon conviction.  This mandatory, inflexible civil 
forfeiture provision imposes on traffickers of counterfeit goods a 
certainty of punishment following conviction previously unseen in 
the realm of criminal trademark counterfeiting legislation.191  With 
suitable application of the statute, the updated § 2320 should serve 
as a strong deterrent to counterfeiters. 
The extent to which federal prosecutors and law enforcement 
agencies will make use of the increased potency of the updated 
§ 2320, however, remains to be seen.  Prosecutors of course remain 
free to seek indictments under any number of statutes when trying 
defendants for the substantive crime of trafficking in counterfeit 
trademarked goods,192 but prosecuting a trafficker of counterfeit 
goods under the updated § 2320 is likely preferable to resorting to 
other more convoluted statutes.  The inherent complexity of a 
 
 189 See Pub. L. No. 109-181, sec. 1–2, § 2320, 120 Stat. 285, 285 (2006) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2320(b)(1) (West 2006)). 
 190 Id. 
 191 See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
 192 In addition to the statutes already discussed at length in this essay, federal 
prosecutors can charge two or more defendants collaborating with one another to traffic 
in counterfeit goods with conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 317 (2000). See, e.g., United 
States v. Yamin, 868 F.2d 130, 133 (5th Cir. 1989).  The crimes of conspiring to traffic 
and attempting to traffic in counterfeit goods may be established even if § 2320 is not 
actually violated. See United States v. Foote, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1279 (D. Kan. 2002).  
Prosecutors can also charge an offender who employs the mails to traffic in goods 
bearing counterfeit trademarks that the offender holds out as legitimate with mail fraud 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000), or with wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000) for 
perpetrating analogous conduct via telephone or internet activity. 
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RICO prosecution plays a focal role in limiting the number of 
RICO prosecutions launched based on unconventional RICO 
predicate offenses such as § 2320 violations.  It is exponentially 
easier for a prosecutor to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the two 
straightforward mens rea prongs required to secure a conviction 
under § 2320—that the defendant intended to traffic in goods and 
knew they were counterfeit193—than it is to prove the multitude of 
elements upon which a RICO conviction must be predicated.194  
The relative simplicity of the updated § 2320 coupled with its 
severe civil forfeiture provisions obviates the need to employ 
RICO in counterfeit goods trafficking prosecutions.  The extent to 
which prosecutors employ the new § 2320 in the coming months 
will soon demonstrate whether the resolve to diligently enforce 
criminal trademark counterfeiting laws has finally arrived. 
IV. NEW YORK’S STATUTORY TREATMENT OF CRIMINAL 
TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING IS INCOMPLETE 
While a number of states have enacted legislation imposing a 
range of criminal penalties for trafficking in counterfeit 
trademarked goods,195 the high concentration of activity emanating 
out of Lower Manhattan196 renders the provisions of the New York 
Penal Law applicable to individuals and organized crime groups 
who traffic in counterfeit trademarked merchandise particularly 
salient examples of state-level statutory anti-counterfeiting 
enforcement schemes.  As a consequence of the federal 
government’s overarching regulatory authority over trademarks, 
the New York Penal Law’s models its definitions of the terms 
“trademark” and “counterfeit trademark” on definitions of the 
same terms in the United States Code.197  Apart from these 
 
 193 See United States v. Baker, 807 F.2d 427, 429 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. 
Infurnari, 647 F. Supp. 57, 58 (W.D.N.Y. 1986). 
 194 See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 195 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 350 (West 2006); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1040/2 (2006); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-15-1190 (2006). 
 196 See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 197 Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.70 (McKinney 2006) (defining a trademark as “any 
word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof adopted and used by a person 
to identify goods made by a person and which distinguish them from those manufactured 
COCKS_GALLEYPROOF_120106.DOC 1/23/2007  4:42 PM 
536 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. Vol. 17:501 
definitional similarities, however, § 2320 bears little resemblance 
to its statutory brethren at the state level.198  The New York Penal 
Law’s stratified codification scheme separates the action of 
trafficking in goods bearing counterfeit trademarks into three 
distinct but closely related crimes distinguishable by their 
ascending levels of severity.199 
The basic trademark counterfeiting offense under New York 
law is trademark counterfeiting in the third degree,200 a class-A 
misdemeanor offense punishable by no more than one year in 
jail.201  An offender is guilty of violating this provision when “with 
the intent to deceive or defraud . . . or . . . evade a lawful restriction 
on the sale . . . or distribution of goods, he or she manufactures, 
distributes, sells, or offers for sale goods which bear a counterfeit 
trademark, or possesses a trademark knowing it to be counterfeit 
 
or sold by others which is in use and which is registered, filed or recorded under the laws 
of this state or of any other state is registered in the principal register of the United States 
patent and trademark office[,]” and a counterfeit trademark as “a spurious trademark or 
an imitation of a trademark that is (a) used in connection with trafficking in goods; and 
(b) used in connection with the sale, offering for sale or distribution of goods that are 
identical with or substantially indistinguishable from a trademark . . . .”), with 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1127 (2000) (defining a trademark as “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any 
combination thereof—(1) used by a person, or (2) which a person has a bona fide 
intention to use in commerce and applies to register on the principle register established 
by this chapter, to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, 
from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if 
that source is unknown.”), and 18 U.S.C.A. § 2320(e)(1)(A) (West 2006) (defining a 
counterfeit trademark as “(A) a spurious mark—(i) that is used in connection with 
trafficking in any goods, services, labels, patches, stickers, wrappers, badges, emblems, 
medallions, charms, boxes, containers, cans, cases, hangtags, documentation or 
packaging of any type or nature; (ii) that is identical with, or substantially 
indistinguishable from, a mark registered on the principal register in the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office and in use, whether or not the defendant knew such mark 
was registered; (iii) that is applied to or used in connection with the goods and services 
for which the mark is registered with the United States Patent and Trademark Office, or is 
applied to or consists of a label, patch, sticker, wrapper, badge, emblem, medallion, 
charm, box, container, can, case, hangtag, documentation or packaging of  any type or 
nature that is designed, marketed, or otherwise intended to be used on or in connection 
with the goods or services for which the mark is registered in the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office; and (iv) the use of which is likely to cause confusion, to cause 
mistake, or to deceive . . . .”). 
 198 See supra note 195; 18 U.S.C.A. § 2320 (West 2006). 
 199 See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 165.71–165.72 (McKinney 2006). 
 200 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.71 (McKinney 2006). 
 201 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.15 (McKinney 2006). 
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for the purpose of affixing it to any goods.”202  The more serious 
offenses of trademark counterfeiting in the second degree, a class-
E felony with a maximum prison sentence of four years,203 and 
trademark counterfeiting in the first degree, a class-C felony 
carrying a maximum prison sentence of fifteen years,204 are 
identical to the lesser offense of trademark counterfeiting in the 
third degree, save the “retail value” of the goods counterfeit.  
When the retail value of the goods bearing counterfeit marks 
surpasses $1,000, trademark counterfeiting in the third degree 
becomes trademark counterfeiting in the second degree,205 while 
when the retail value of the goods bearing counterfeit trademarks 
surpasses $100,000, the offense becomes trademark counterfeiting 
in the first degree.206 
The use of “retail value” figures to stratify what are effectively 
identical criminal acts into three distinct crimes constitutes one of 
the more intriguing aspects of New York’s statutory treatment of 
trademark counterfeiting and poses an interesting contrast to 
federal law.  When the trademark counterfeiting statutes first came 
into effect in 1992, the statutes defined “value” as the “value of 
such goods, or trademark.”207  The “retail value” measure arose out 
of People v. Kim,208 when prosecutors sought to indict a defendant 
arrested in connection with police officers’ seizure of 8,000 
counterfeit handbags on charges of trademark counterfeiting in the 
first degree, on the premise that the value of the trademarks at 
issue, calculated on the basis of worldwide sales of the holders of 
the trademarks, easily surpassed the $100,000 threshold.209  The 
court declined to adopt this novel prosecutorial formulation, 
holding instead that value should be “calculated as the incremental 
value given to the goods by the affixing of the appropriated 
 
 202 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.71. 
 203 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.00, 165.72 (McKinney 2006). 
 204 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.00, 165.73 (McKinney 2006). 
 205 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.72. 
 206 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.73. 
 207 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.70 cmt. (McKinney 2006) (William C. Donnino, Practice 
Commentary). 
 208 621 N.Y.S.2d 479 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1994). 
 209 Id. at 480. 
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trademark.”210  Subsequent to People v. Kim, the Legislature 
amended the definition of value to “the retail value of all such 
goods bearing counterfeit trademarks.”211  Unerring adherence to 
this formulation, however, drives prosecutors and law enforcement 
agents to chase always after the largest distributors of counterfeit 
goods, often at the expense of ignoring smaller-scale traffickers.212  
Prosecutors are able to charge high-volume wholesalers based on 
the retail value of the counterfeit goods they recover, despite the 
fact that the wholesalers’ sale price is by definition below the retail 
price of the merchandise.213 
The federal analogue of the New York state statutes, § 2320, 
does not follow suit in assigning various traffickers of counterfeit 
goods to predetermined strata of criminal culpability based on the 
retail value of their counterfeit goods.214  More curiously, § 2320 
also does not impose a liability baseline beneath which its 
provisions are inapplicable.215  Under New York state law, 
prosecutors can only charge defendants caught with counterfeit 
trademarked goods the retail value of which is less than the $1,000 
liability floor with a misdemeanor.216  There is no federal 
misdemeanor for minor violations of § 2320.217  Two theories 
explain the absence of such a penalty, which would be ideal for use 
against low-level traffickers of counterfeit trademarked goods.  
First, Congress may believe that trafficking in counterfeit goods is 
so grave a crime that even the most minor instances of such 
conduct, if discovered by law enforcement authorities, warrant 
felony charges.  The second, and more probable, explanation is 
that Congress finds that at its lowest levels, trafficking in 
counterfeit goods is not an appropriate province for federal 
legislation.  The notion that one can technically face federal felony 
charges under § 2320 for a single isolated sale of a counterfeit 
paperweight nonetheless remains unsettling. 
 
 210 Id. at 481–82. 
 211 See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 165.72–165.73 (McKinney 2006). 
 212 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.70 cmt. (William C. Donnino, Practice Commentary). 
 213 See supra notes 205–210 and accompanying text. 
 214 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2320 (West 2006). 
 215 See id. 
 216 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 165.71–165.72 (McKinney 2006). 
 217 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2320. 
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The glaring absence of the trademark counterfeiting statutes 
from New York’s enterprise corruption218 and money laundering 
statutes219 is even more perplexing.  Like RICO and the Money 
Laundering Act, New York’s enterprise corruption and money 
laundering statutes include enumerated laundry lists of crimes 
constituting predicate acts that may underpin convictions under the 
relevant substantive statute.220  In contrast to the federal statutory 
scheme, where § 2320 is catalogued as both a laundry list offense 
for the Money Laundering Act and a predicate offense for RICO, 
none of New York’s trademark counterfeiting statutes are 
“criminal act” predicates for its enterprise corruption and money 
laundering statutes.221  While the omission of trademark 
counterfeiting in the third degree is expected, the absence of 
trademark counterfeiting in the second, and even more so in the 
first, degree is confounding. 
The Legislature added the trademark counterfeiting crimes to 
the Penal Law because it “believed that prosecution of those who 
specialize in fraud by the use of counterfeit trademarks would be 
facilitated by creation of a crime specifically tailored to cover such 
conduct.”222  It apparently did not believe, however, that corrupt 
enterprises could systematically perpetrate a pattern of fraud 
through the use of counterfeit trademarks, or that narcotics 
traffickers could use the sale of goods bearing counterfeit 
trademarks as means of laundering the profits from their narcotics 
sales.223  The Legislature’s omission of felony-level trademark 
counterfeiting from the list of “criminal act” predicates appears so 
unfounded that it might be the result of an oversight.  If, however, 
the Legislature consciously omitted felony trademark 
counterfeiting from the “criminal act,” its dedication to diligent 
governmental enforcement of criminal trademark counterfeiting 
laws is cast in serious doubt. 
 
 218 Organized Crime Control Act, N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 460.00–460.80 (McKinney 
2006). 
 219 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 470.00–470.25 (McKinney 2006). 
 220 See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 460.10(1)(a), 470.00. 
 221 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 460.10. 
 222 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.70 cmt. (McKinney 2006) (William C. Donnino, Practice 
Commentary). 
 223 See supra note 221. 
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V. UNCONVENTIONAL CIVIL ENFORCEMENT MEASURES ARE 
EFFECTIVE IN THWARTING COUNTERFEITERS 
Lawful trademark owners cannot rely upon governmental 
actors to enforce the criminal statutory schemes that proscribe 
trademark counterfeiting.224  Trademark holders who insist on 
vigorous protection of their brands against the intrusions of 
counterfeiters must thus take unilateral civil action against 
traffickers of goods bearing their counterfeit trademarks.  The 
Lanham Act affords trademark owners the most immediate means 
through which to pursue counterfeiters.225  Under the Lanham 
Act’s recovery provisions, once a trademark holder prevails in a 
civil action against a counterfeiter, the trademark owner may 
recover from the counterfeiter any profits the counterfeiter attained 
by using the owner’s counterfeit trademark and any damages 
suffered by the plaintiff as a consequence of the counterfeiting, as 
well as court costs.226  The Lanham Act additionally mandates that, 
absent an explicit finding of exigent circumstances, the presiding 
trial court judge must by law award treble damages and attorneys’ 
fees to the trademark owner,227 and offers trademark holders the 
opportunity to elect at any time prior to the court’s imposition of 
final judgment to recover statutory damages in place of actual 
damages and profits.228 
While these recovery provisions suggest that the Lanham 
Act229 provides trademark owners with ample opportunities to 
attain pecuniary compensation and damages from counterfeiters, 
the reality remains that most civil remedies remain largely 
ineffective because counterfeiters hide their assets so cunningly 
that recovery becomes impossible.230  The Lanham Act’s 
mandatory imposition of treble damages231 against civil defendants 
adjudged to be counterfeiters may appear to be a powerful weapon 
 
 224 See generally Neumer, supra note 22. 
 225 See 15 U.S.C.A §§ 1051–1129 (West 2006). 
 226 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1117(a) (West 2006). 
 227 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1117(b) (West 2006). 
 228 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1117(c) (West 2006). 
 229 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1117 (West 2006). 
 230 See Kolsun & Bayer, supra note 20, at 385–86. 
 231 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1117(b). 
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in fighting trademark counterfeiting, but treble damages pose 
neither a threat nor a concern to wily counterfeiters who 
manipulate their finances to suggest they own no assets against 
which courts can assess damages.232  Counterfeit goods traffickers 
who file for bankruptcy, whether feigned or legitimate, as well as 
those who respond to a court’s assessment of a civil judgment 
against them with an outright refusal to comply with its terms, pose 
additional significant impediments to rightful trademark owners 
seeking to curb the counterfeiting of their brands through civil 
action.233 
The Lanham Act234 also fails to provide lawful trademark 
owners who unearth counterfeit iterations of their trademarked 
goods for sale in otherwise reputable retail outlets with a suitable 
remedy.  The Third Circuit’s decision in Gucci America, Inc. v. 
Daffy’s, Inc.235 illustrates the precise nature of this deficiency.  
This case arose when Daffy’s, a discount clothing retail chain, 
acquired what it believed to be 594 authentic Gucci “Jackie-O” 
handbags in three different sizes from a Sara’s Collection, Inc., a 
reputable supplier that Daffy’s had purchased products from in the 
past.236  Daffy’s attempted to authenticate these bags by 
dispatching an employee to a Gucci outlet store with one of the 
bags in hand, where a Gucci clerk confirmed the bag was 
genuine.237  Daffy’s also sent one of the bags to the Gucci repair 
center in New York, which fixed the bag and returned it to Daffy’s 
with no additional inquiry.238  Daffy’s eventually sold 588 of these 
594 bags, reaping a gross profit of $51,064.12.239  Daffy’s 
maintained it remained blissfully unaware of any problem with the 
bags until it received a letter from Gucci attorneys indicating the 
bags, while of startlingly high quality, were in fact counterfeit.240  
Gucci shortly thereafter filed a suit against Daffy’s in the U.S. 
 
 232 See Peterson, supra note 44, at 492. 
 233 See id. 
 234 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051–1129 (West 2006). 
 235 354 F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 236 Id. at 229. 
 237 Id. at 230. 
 238 Id. 
 239 Id. at 245 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). 
 240 See id. at 230 (majority opinion). 
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District Court for the District of New Jersey, in which it sought to 
obtain Daffy’s profits from its sale of the counterfeit bags, and to 
enjoin Daffy’s from further use of the Gucci trademark.241  The 
district court ruled that Gucci was entitled to neither an injunction 
against Daffy’s, nor the discount retailer’s profits from its sale of 
the bags bearing counterfeit Gucci trademarks.242  The Third 
Circuit, in a two-to-one split decision, affirmed, holding that 
because Gucci could not prove that Daffy’s knew the bags were 
counterfeit, it could not recover profits from the discount 
retailer.243  The court concluded that “[t]he price and quality of the 
of the handbags at issue, the small number of the bags sold, 
Daffy’s status as an innocent infringer, and the possibility that 
Gucci could recover from the actual manufacturer of the bags all 
weigh against awarding profits.”244 
The Third Circuit’s assertion that Gucci might be able to 
recover from the counterfeiters themselves is of course little more 
than pretense,245 but it is nonetheless disquieting in its 
offhandedness.  Equally unnerving is the circuit court’s affirmation 
of the lower court’s holding that Daffy’s was an innocent infringer 
based solely on the fact that Daffy’s had one of the bags 
authenticated by a retail clerk in a Gucci outlet store and sent 
another bag to Gucci’s service center for repair.246  Most unsettling 
of all, however, is the fact that the Third Circuit’s holding in Gucci 
America may have emboldened other seemingly reputable discount 
retailers to dabble in the sale of ersatz luxury goods items bearing 
counterfeit trademarks.  In June of 2006, Fendi, a subsidiary of 
Louis Vuitton Moet Hennessy (“LVMH”), filed suit against Wal-
 
 241 See id. at 228, 230, 231. 
 242 See id. at 231. 
 243 See id. at 228, 242, 243. 
 244 Id. at 242–43. 
 245 See supra notes 232–233 and accompanying text. 
 246 See Gucci America, 354 F.3d at 244–45 (Rosenn, J., dissenting) (Daffy’s perfunctory 
attempt to authenticate the bags “was simply a superficial effort to cover itself in the 
event of a lawsuit.  Daffy’s did not take the bag to the store manager or to someone in 
authority in the Gucci organization who was familiar with the construction of the bag.  It 
satisfied its concern by asking some unknown retail clerk of unknown experience, of 
unknown authority, and with unknown familiarity with the intricacies of bag 
construction, to confirm the authenticity of the bag.  It also sent a damaged bag to the 
Gucci repair center without any specific inquiry as to the authenticity of the bag.”). 
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Mart Stores, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York, alleging that a number of stores in Wal-
Mart’s Sam’s Club wholesale club chain were selling handbags 
and other small leather goods bearing counterfeit Fendi 
trademarks.247  While Fendi is seeking an injunction and damages, 
Wal-Mart maintains the handbags and leather goods its Sam’s 
Club stores are selling are authentic Fendi products, not 
counterfeits.248  Even if the handbags and leather goods ultimately 
prove themselves to be counterfeit, however, Fendi’s ability to 
recover profits from Wal-Mart in the wake of Gucci America is 
uncertain at best. 
No doubt because of the problems lawful trademark owners 
encounter attempting to recover against counterfeiters under the 
Lanham Act,249 when Congress enacted the 1996 Act250 it appeared 
that the legislature was nearly as enthusiastic about the prospect of 
lawful trademark owners employing 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), the civil 
remedies section of RICO, against counterfeiters as it was about 
bestowing upon federal prosecutors the ability to combat the 
counterfeit goods trade through the statutory heavy weaponry of 
RICO’s criminal provisions.251  Under § 1964(c), any individual or 
entity that suffers an injury to his business or property as the result 
of a violation of § 1962 has the ability to sue an offender to recover 
treble damages and attorneys’ fees.252  While a civil RICO plaintiff 
must allege all the elements required to secure a criminal RICO 
conviction, a civil RICO plaintiff needs to prove these elements 
only by a preponderance of the evidence.253  Few lawful trademark 
owners, however, have made use of RICO’s civil action provision 
to pursue counterfeiters, because § 1964(c) affords trademark 
owners no ability to make additional pecuniary recoveries against 
 
 247 See Fendi Says Wal-Mart Is Selling Counterfeits, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2006, at B3; 
Fendi Sues Wal-Mart on Counterfeiting, WOMEN’S WEAR DAILY, June 13, 2006, at 2. 
 248 See Fendi Sues Wal-Mart on Counterfeiting, supra note 247. 
 249 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051–1129 (West 2006). 
 250 Pub. L. No. 104-153, 110 Stat. 1386 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
15 U.S.C., 17 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 19 U.S.C. and 49 U.S.C.). 
 251 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-556, at 6–7 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1074, 
1080–81. 
 252 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000). 
 253 See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 491, 496 (1985). 
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counterfeiters over and above those authorized under the Lanham 
Act.254  Additionally, though it is more difficult and time-
consuming to prove a RICO violation, even by a lower 
preponderance of the evidence standard, than it is to prove a 
Lanham Act violation, plaintiffs seeking to recover under both 
statutes face the same significant impediments in attaining actual 
pecuniary recovery against counterfeiters.  Lawful trademark 
owners thus have little incentive to employ § 1964(c) to protect 
their brands. 
The most obvious means of circumventing the obstacles that 
hinder trademark owners’ ability to recover from counterfeiters has 
proven to be one of the most effective: taking action against the 
individuals and entities that enable traffickers of counterfeit goods 
to ply their illicit trade, rather than pursing counterfeiters directly.  
The ability of trademark owners to initiate action against parties 
who facilitate counterfeit goods traffickers’ unlawful business is 
rooted in the judicially-constructed doctrine of contributory 
trademark liability.255  Under this doctrine, trademark holders may 
sue parties that provide the site and facilities for known counterfeit 
goods trafficking activities.256  Plaintiffs typically fulfill the crucial 
component of the doctrine—that the third party enabler knows 
counterfeiters are using the site or facilities it owns to traffic in 
counterfeit goods—by sending notice letters to the enablers 
averring to illicit use.257  Courts hold that willful blindness on the 
part of an enabler constitutes knowledge under the doctrine.258  If a 
trademark owner is unable to show actual knowledge or willful 
blindness, but can demonstrate that the enabler has reason to know 
of the counterfeit goods trafficking activity, the trademark holder 
 
 254 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (providing for the recovery of treble damages and 
attorneys’ fees), with 15 U.S.C.A. § 1117 (West 2006) (also providing for the recovery of 
treble damages and attorneys’ fees). 
 255 See, e.g., Power Test Petrol. Distribs., Inc. v. Manhattan & Queens Fuel Corp., 
556 F. Supp. 392, 394 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (“[T]he doctrine of contributory infringement 
was developed as a judicial gloss on the infringement provision of the Lanham Act.”). 
 256 See Fonsovia, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing 
Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986)). 
 257 See Kolsun & Bayer, supra note 20, at 416. 
 258 See Hard Rock Café Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 
1149 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Louis Vuitton, S.A. v. Lee, 875 F.2d 584, 590 (7th Cir. 
1989)). 
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cannot recover treble damages or attorneys’ fees, but may still 
recover actual damages.259 
Gucci has employed this doctrine to take action against an 
internet service provider used by a trafficker of jewelry bearing 
Gucci’s counterfeit trademark to advertise its illicit operation,260 
and Tiffany recently used it as grounds to file suit against eBay for 
facilitating auctions of counterfeit jewelry.261  Trademark owners 
achieve the most success under the doctrine, however, when they 
sue the landlords of the storefronts out of which traffickers sell 
counterfeit goods.262  Once trademark owners serve landlords with 
notice of counterfeiting activity on property the landlord owns, the 
landlord must take “reasonable steps to rid the premises of the 
illegal activity,”263 including evicting the counterfeiters,264 or else 
risk exposing themselves to civil liability for the counterfeiting.265  
Trademark owners who sue landlords under a unique facet of New 
York state law, which holds landlords who knowingly permit 
tenants to engage in illegal trade or business on their premises 
jointly and severally liable for the conduct of their tenants,266 enjoy 
an additional avenue of civil enforcement.  New York courts 
explicitly hold that a landlord’s knowledge of his tenants’ use of 
his premises for trademark counterfeiting subjects the landlord to 
full-scale liability for the criminal conduct of his tenants.267  The 
doctrine of contributory liability is the most effective weapon 
trademark holders can employ to combat counterfeiting at both the 
state and federal levels because it enables them to pursue entities 
incapable of concealing their assets.  These entities must either 
eradicate counterfeiting on the premises over which they have 
 
 259 See id. at 1151; 15 U.S.C.A. § 1117 (West 2006). 
 260 See Gucci America, Inc. v. Hall & Assoc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 261 See First Amended Complaint, Tiffany Inc. v. eBay, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 4607 
(S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2004), 2004 WL 1413904. 
 262 See Kolsun & Bayer, supra note 20, at 418. 
 263 Polo Ralph Lauren Corp. v. Chinatown Gift Shop, No. 93 Civ. 6783, slip op. at 1 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 1996). 
 264 See infra note 269 and accompanying text. 
 265 See Kolsun & Bayer, supra note 20, at 413. 
 266 See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 231 (McKinney 2006). 
 267 See 1165 Broadway Corp. v. Dayana of N.Y. Sportswear, 633 N.Y.S.2d 724, 726 
(Civ. Ct., N.Y. County 1995). 
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dominion and control, or else confront the unpleasant prospect of 
exposing themselves to treble damages liability. 
Pursuing third-party enablers of counterfeit goods trafficking 
under the doctrine of contributory liability may actually be meeting 
with some success in curtailing the counterfeit goods trade in the 
United States.  In July of 2005, LVMH, after having filed suit in 
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York 
against Richard Carroll, the landlord of seven properties on Canal 
Street out of which tenants engaged in the trafficking of counterfeit 
Louis Vuitton bags, reached a permanent injunction on consent.268  
The injunction required Carroll to post signs in highly visible 
locations inside and outside his properties warning that the 
businesses operating on the premises are not authorized Louis 
Vuitton retailers, and that the purchase of counterfeits may result 
in legal action.269  The injunction further ordered Carroll move to 
immediately evict the current tenants at the seven premises, and 
inform future tenants of the consequences of selling counterfeit 
goods, which under the terms of the injunction include mandatory 
eviction if LVMH owns the counterfeit trademarks.270  Finally, the 
injunction called for a monitor to conduct weekly warrantless 
searches of the public and private areas of the seven properties for 
a year, with LVMH and Carroll splitting the costs.271  Detractors of 
this tactic would argue that such lawsuits serve only to drive the 
counterfeit goods trade quite literally further underground, into 
clandestine basement bazaars slightly north of Canal Street.272  
LVMH, however, appears to find such criticism unpersuasive, for 
it has subsequently brought two nearly identical suits against 
additional landlords, the most recent of which implicated twenty 
 
 268 See Liza Casabona, LVMH Wins Judgment Against Landlord, WOMEN’S WEAR 
DAILY, July 1, 2005, at 2; Ross Tucker, LVMH Notches Victory in Counterfeiting Case, 
WOMEN’S WEAR DAILY, Apr. 21, 2005, at 14. 
 269 See Casabona, supra note 268; Tucker, supra note 268. 
 270 See Casabona, supra note 268; Tucker, supra note 268. 
 271 See Casabona, supra note 268; Anthony Ramirez, Chinatown Journal; On Canal St., 
Ferreting Out the Louis Vuitton Imposters, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, § 1, at 27; Tucker, 
supra note 268. 
 272 See Orla Healy, Ab Fab Fakes—High Quality Bags in Chinatown Underground, 
N.Y. POST, Dec. 1, 2005, at 22 (describing a covert journey, replete with lookouts and 
handoffs, to a subterranean retailer of high-quality counterfeit handbags located in a 
basement in northern Chinatown). 
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premises on Canal Street out of which counterfeit goods are 
trafficked, and obtained commensurate injunctions in both 
actions.273  The terms of the injunctions now apply to as many as 
100 street-level retailers.274 
VI. CRIMINAL TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING PROHIBITIONS  
MUST BE ENFORCED MORE CONSISTENTLY 
The signs that LVMH mandates property owners post as a 
component of compliance with its standard injunction caution in 
pertinent part: “this retailer is not authorized or licensed to sell 
Louis Vuitton merchandise.  The N.Y.P.D. and Louis Vuitton 
investigate any sale or purchase of counterfeit merchandise at this 
location.  Counterfeiting is civilly and criminally punishable under 
federal and state law by up to 10 years of imprisonment and 
$2,000,000 in fines.”275  These notices suggest that LVMH is not 
itself above resorting to chicanery in combating the counterfeit 
goods trade by attempting to frighten potential purchasers of 
merchandise bearing counterfeit Louis Vuitton trademarks out of 
making such acquisitions.  The warning is of course on its face 
literally true, but it is essentially an elaborate piece of sales 
puffery, for under United States law at both the federal and state 
levels, retail purchasers of goods bearing counterfeit trademarks—
customers of the lowest-level traffickers—are not subject to 
criminal penalties.  A trademark holder such as LVMH could 
conceivably sue retail purchasers of counterfeit goods bearing their 
trademarks under the Lanham Act,276 but would never in practice 
initiate such an action because the attorney assigned to draft the 
complaint in such a case would earn more money in the one 
quarter of a billable hour it took to fill in boilerplate than the mark 
holder could ever hope to recover trough the suit.  Yet while legal 
 
 273 See Galloni, supra note 28; Ramirez, supra note 271. 
 274 See Ramirez, supra note 271. 
 275 Press Release, LVMH, Louis Vuitton Obtains Preliminary Injunction Representing 
Unprecedented Victory in Battle Against Counterfeiting and Reduction of Criminal 
Activity on Canal Street (Apr. 19, 2005) (on file with author), available  
at http://www.arentfox.com/press_releases/content659_supplement.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2006). 
 276 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051–1129 (West 2006). 
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professionals versed in the current state of the law would quickly 
finger LVMH’s notice as an abject scare tactic, it is a tactic that 
may well realize its intended goal, since most of the individuals 
who comprise counterfeit goods traffickers’ target market of 
tourists, suburbanites, and young individuals eager to keep pace 
with fashion trends likely have little or no knowledge of the 
workings of 18 U.S.C. § 2320 and the New York Penal Law. 
Then again, consumer demand for counterfeit luxury 
merchandise shows no signs of abating despite the fact that some 
purchasers of counterfeit trademarked goods apparently believe 
they are buying stolen but authentic merchandise,277 which they 
presumably understand, at least in an abstract sense, constitutes the 
crime of receiving stolen property.  Perhaps LVMH’s disingenuous 
warning notices may not pack the deterrent punch the company 
hopes.  The misleading phrasing of the warning notices could also 
be the product of wishful thinking on the part of a company 
headquartered in France, a nation which has criminalized the 
purchase of counterfeit products278 and recently taken to slapping 
Chinese tourists who arrive in the country carrying ersatz luxury 
goods such as counterfeit Louis Vuitton handbags with heavy 
fines.279  LVMH would likely be overjoyed, and its fellow luxury 
goods purveyors would be similarly enthused, if the United States 
elected to follow France’s lead and criminalize the purchase as 
well as the sale of goods bearing counterfeit trademarks. 
Any move by either the federal government or one of the states 
to criminalize within the United States the act of acquiring as well 
as vending counterfeit trademarked merchandise, however, would 
prove an egregious mistake.  It is unsurprising that countries such 
as France and Italy whose national economies are heavily 
dependant on the luxury goods sector have criminalized the retail 
purchase of counterfeit trademarked goods,280 since such 
legislative action is an unabashed boon to the luxury goods 
industry.  For the other sectors of the economy and for society as a 
 
 277 See Ramirez, supra note 271. 
 278 See Galloni, supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 279 See Howard W. French, Next Wave of Camera-Wielding Tourists Is From China, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2006, at A3. 
 280 See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text. 
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whole, however, it is essentially worthless.  Luxury items, though 
they receive the most attention, are not the only type of goods 
subject to counterfeiting.  Counterfeit pharmaceuticals and vehicle 
parts are both growing problems in the United States.281  If an 
American government entity were to criminalize the purchase of 
counterfeit trademarked goods, it would have to adopt a carefully-
balanced legislative scheme to avert the public relations nightmare 
of overzealous law enforcement officers arresting, and determined 
prosecutors convicting, a confused grandmother who purchases 
counterfeit medicine over the internet, or a father of four who buys 
counterfeit brake pads at a cut-rate auto supply store because the 
store advertised them as simply being on sale.282 
Such a statutory scheme would likely involve a “knowingly 
and intentionally” mens rea requirement under which prosecutors 
would have to prove that the defendant not only made a purchase 
of counterfeit goods, but made the purchase knowing that the 
merchandise was counterfeit.283  Such a strict mens rea 
requirement would belie the purpose of such a statute by allowing 
most defendants to claim ignorance and escape conviction.  The 
only defendant a judge or jury would be likely to convict under 
such a stringent mens rea requirement is, unsurprisingly, a 
purchaser of counterfeit luxury goods, who is unlikely to prevail 
on a defense that she reasonably believed that the Prada bag she 
bought in Chinatown was real, even though she bought it for less 
than one-tenth the price of the legitimate article.  A statute 
criminalizing the purchase of counterfeit trademarked goods would 
thus effectively criminalize only the purchase of counterfeit luxury 
goods,284 and an industry in which the rainmakers are $9000 
handbags285 does not warrant this quotient of individualized 
statutory protection. 
 
 281 See generally Amendolara, supra note 57, at 810–12. 
 282 See id. 
 283 See supra text accompanying note 193. 
 284 Such a statute would also effectively criminalize the purchase of pirated music and 
filmed entertainment, but these products are distinguishable on the ground that they are 
subject to copyright rather than trademark protection. 
 285 See Tracie Rozhon, Even if Just a Bauble, Luxury Counts for Holidays, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 12, 2004, § 1, at C4 (noting the list price of the Hermes Birkin bag as $9000). 
COCKS_GALLEYPROOF_120106.DOC 1/23/2007  4:42 PM 
550 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. Vol. 17:501 
To be sure, illegal commerce in trademarked counterfeit goods 
is not a victimless crime.  Legitimate manufacturers, wholesalers 
and retailers across all spectrums of the national economy lose 
hundreds of billions of dollars each year at the hands of trademark 
counterfeiters.286  The illicit industry of trafficking in counterfeit 
trademarks, however, does not merely exact pecuniary losses from 
wealthy corporations.  It also inflicts a very human, and 
occasionally deadly, toll on the individuals on both sides of the law 
who wage the daily battle over counterfeits in the streets.  To 
understand how ruinous the counterfeit goods trade can be for both 
law enforcement officers and innocent bystanders, one need look 
no further than former police officer Bryan Conroy’s mortal 
shooting of Ousmane Zongo, a West African immigrant, during a 
N.Y.P.D. raid on a counterfeit compact-disc trafficking operation 
in Chelsea and subsequent conviction for criminally negligent 
homicide;287 Zongo had nothing to do with the counterfeiting 
ring.288  The illegal industry can also be deadly for traffickers—a 
suspected counterfeiter fell to his death from a ninth-story window 
in Koreatown while attempting to flee from police officers 
executing a search warrant for trademark counterfeiting 
activity289—and, at least tangentially, for their pursuers: a 
N.Y.P.D. sergeant attached to an elite squad and said to be in 
excellent physical condition collapsed and died after giving chase 
to a vendor of counterfeit Oakley sunglasses in SoHo.290  
Criminalizing the purchase of counterfeit goods, however, would 
not have prevented these deaths, and is as unlikely to prevent 
future deaths as it is to stem the unceasing tide of counterfeit 
goods. 
Admittedly, the American statutes in force at both the federal 
and New York state levels that criminalize trafficking in goods 
bearing counterfeit trademarks are not perfect.  Congress should 
 
 286 See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text. 
 287 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.10 (McKinney 2006).  See Amanda Hartocollis, Officer 
Guilty of Negligence in ’03 Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2005, at A1. 
 288 See Sabrina Tavernise & William K. Rashbaum, Charges Are Seen In Police 
Gunfire, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2004, at A1. 
 289 Man Falls to Death from Midtown Building, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2003, at B4. 
 290 Michael Wilson, Police Officer Dies After Chasing Sidewalk Vendor in SoHo, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 1, 2004, § 1, at 31. 
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amend the federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2320, to stratify the crime of 
trafficking in counterfeit goods or services into multiple offense 
levels, so that street-level vendors of counterfeit trademarked 
goods, who are often caught between law enforcement officers 
seeking to curb counterfeiting and organized crime groups 
pressuring them to sell ersatz merchandise,291  do not face the same 
federal felony charges prosecutors would levy against the leader of 
the organized crime syndicate forcing them to sell the counterfeit 
goods.  Conversely, the New York State Legislature should amend 
the Penal Law so that it lists felony-level trademark counterfeiting 
offenses292 among the designated “criminal acts” that can serve as 
predicate offenses under the state’s enterprise corruption293 and 
money laundering statutes.294  The Legislature should also follow 
the lead of Congress and amend the seizure and destruction of 
goods provision of the criminal trademark counterfeiting statute295 
to call for mandatory, rather than optional, seizure of any and all 
goods “manufactured, sold, offered for sale, distributed or 
produced in violation”296 of the state’s prohibitions on trademark 
counterfeiting, and further amend the provision by expanding to 
include mandatory seizure of any and all instrumentalities used to 
violate the trademark counterfeiting prohibitions.  Even without 
these relatively minor amendments, however, the criminal statutes 
proscribing trafficking in counterfeit trademarked goods currently 
in place at the both the federal and New York state levels, amount 
to formidable anti-counterfeiting weapons if prosecutors and law 
enforcement authorities apply them dynamically. 
The illicit counterfeit goods industry in the United States 
continues to proliferate.  The economic losses attributable to the 
counterfeit goods trade in the United States have increased 
$50 billion since 2001 alone.297  The amount of money New York 
 
 291 See Adam Fifield, The Knockoff Squad, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2002, § 14, at 1. 
 292 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 165.72–165.73 (McKinney 2006). 
 293 Organized Crime Control Act, N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 460.00–460.80 (McKinney 
2006). 
 294 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 470.00–470.25 (McKinney 2006). 
 295 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.74 (McKinney 2006). 
 296 Id. 
 297 Compare Flynn, supra note 6 (noting that the counterfeit goods trade costs American 
businesses $250 million each year), with Julian E. Barnes, Fake Goods Are Flowing 
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City loses in uncollected tax revenue each year at the hands of 
commercial counterfeiters has increased by over $600 million 
since 1997.298  Despite the international breadth, massive 
pecuniary scope and deadly effects of the illegal counterfeit goods 
trade, in addition to the ominous presence of organized crime 
syndicates and terrorist groups in the illicit industry, detractors 
erroneously maintain that trademark counterfeiting remains a 
victimless crime.  Some go so far as to assert that counterfeiting 
may not even harm the owners of the trademarks that criminals 
counterfeit.299 Others are less vocal, but their actions speak 
volumes.  In August of 2005, this author witnessed New York 
County Assistant District Attorneys refuse to file felony charges 
against an offender whom the police discovered in a raid amidst a 
sea of counterfeit luxury goods, items whose retail value far 
exceeded the $1000 statutory threshold for felony-level 
culpability,300 in direct contravention of the repeated and insistent 
requests of the arresting N.Y.P.D. officers.  As this observation 
anecdotally demonstrates, it is not a lack of statutory potency that 
presents a hindrance to current criminal anti-counterfeiting 
prosecutions. 
New York’s trademark counterfeiting statutes, and especially 
their recently amended and fortified federal counterpart, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2320, provide prosecutors with strong and versatile enforcement 
implements.  The new and long-overdue mandatory seizure 
provisions of § 2320 in particular provide a certainty of 
punishment upon conviction not previously present in the realm of 
criminal trademark counterfeiting, and thus present a unique 
opportunity for federal prosecutors to make real inroads against 
 
Under the Radar, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2001, § 3, at 4 (reporting that the American 
economy loses $200 billion to counterfeit goods annually). 
 298 Compare Press Release, supra note 9 (noting that New York City loses $1.03 billion 
in tax revenue at the hands of the counterfeit goods trade), with Peter F. Vallone, 
Speaker, N.Y. City Council, Address to the Counterfeiting Press Conference (Dec. 7, 
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 299 See, e.g., Stewart Whitwell, Brand Papers—Piracy: Faking It Can Be Good, BRAND 
STRATEGY, May 8, 2006, at 30, available at 2006 WL 7914348 (arguing that being 
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 300 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.72 (McKinney 2006). 
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counterfeiters.  To date, however, criminal trademark 
counterfeiting prosecutions at both the state and federal level 
systematically lack the zeal, ingenuity and unrelenting 
determination of their civil counterparts.  As long as the 
individuals and agencies tasked with prosecuting traffickers of 
counterfeit goods persist in their lack of resolve to act with the 
diligence, expedience, and evenhandedness required to rein in such 
a pervasive criminal activity, the tide of the illicit trademark 
counterfeiting trade will continue to flow unabated. 
